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Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property
Characteristics of Political Money
Spencer A. Overton 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1235 (2000)
This Article argues that money contributed to and spent on
political campaigns ('political money") possesses many of the
traits that explain judicial respect for regulation of property, and
that courts reviewing restrictions on political money should con-
sider doctrines associated with the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Property Clauses. As evidenced by the different de-
grees of respect afforded to regulations of property and speech,
judicial treatment of a particular liberty interest can be ex-
plained by the presence and particular posturing of distinct func-
tional issues such as distrust, scarcity, distribution, and interfer-
ence with others' interests. Campaign finance jurisprudence,
however, has categorized political money as warranting exacting
judicial protection under the First Amendment, and this formal-
ism causes courts to overlook the intersection of two different
constitutional doctrines in the political money context. Instead,
courts should glean lessons from both property and speech doc-
trines to determine the appropriate judicial approach in review-
ing regulations of political money.
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INTRODUCTION
"Money is property; it is not speech."' So wrote Justice John
Paul Stevens in support of the Supreme Court's recent decision to up-
hold restrictions on campaign contributions in Nixon v. Shrink Mis-
souri Gov't PAC.2 This simple point, which attacks the theoretical
underpinnings of the leading campaign finance case, Buckley v. Valeo,3
is more than a meaningless semantic ploy. Rather, by shifting the
debate, the language allows for a new analytical framework and pro-
vides fresh insights. A discussion of money in politics limited to
speech principles, and overlooking property issues, necessarily leads
to an incomplete resolution of the campaign finance dilemma. This
Article proposes that courts consider both constitutional speech doc-
1. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 910 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 897 (reversing an Eighth Circuit ruling that $1075 state contribution limits vio-
lated the First Amendment).
3. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see discussion infra Part I.A.
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trines and constitutional property doctrines in developing a new ap-
proach to judicial review of campaign finance restrictions.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court significantly curtailed the
authority of the democratic decision-making process with regard to
political money by applying high First Amendment scrutiny to provi-
sions of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.' The
Buckley Court reasoned that money was a necessary ingredient of
"effective" political speech, and that restrictions on political contribu-
tions and political expenditures ("political money") thus burdened
political speech.5 Employing high First Amendment scrutiny, the
Court upheld a $1000 contribution limit that it found satisfied a gov-
ernmental interest in preventing corruption,6 but invalidated restric-
tions on spending.! In rejecting as illegitimate the government's al-
leged interest in equalization of the ability of citizens to affect elec-
tions, the Court stated that "the concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."8
Buckley's detractors have traditionally claimed that the case
ignores the disparities in wealth among citizens and effectively magni-
fies the influence of affluence. Critics have insisted that the case
erects a disastrous barrier to legislation aimed at enabling wide-
spread, meaningful democratic participation, noting that almost
eighty percent of political money raised originates from less than one
percent of the population, while the remaining twenty percent comes
from less than six percent of the population.9 Some have emphasized
Buckley's inconsistency with earlier rulings mandating that "each citi-
zen [shall] have an equally effective voice!"' in the election of political
officials." A number of Buckley's critics, apparently conceding that
4. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (repealed 1976); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45.
5. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-20.
6. See id. at 26-29. In Shrink, the Court reviewed contribution limits using a standard of
scrutiny that was more stringent than intermediate scrutiny but "different" from the strict
scrutiny applied to expenditure limits. See Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 903-04; infra note 71.
7. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-48.
8. Id. at 48-49.
9. See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superi-
ority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1177 (1994); see also E.
Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in "Faulty Assumptions" A Response to Professor
Smith's Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 CONN. L. REV. 867, 888 (1998) (noting that
only four to six percent of Americans make any campaign contributions at all).
10. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
11. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Cam-




spending is tantamount to speaking, have tried to shift attention to
the concepts found in the Equal Protection Clause as special constitu-
tional warrants for campaign finance reform. Specifically, these com-
mentators have argued that constitutional concerns for equality allow
for restrictions on the use of political money, and may even compel
affirmative steps, such as public financing of elections, to ensure that
citizens have equally effective voices.'
Although campaign finance scholarship is characterized by de-
bate over whether the Constitution requires unrestrained freedom in
its use or mandates some degree of equality in its use,13 the dialogue is
limited. By tying campaign financing to fixed constitutional principles
that impair democratic responses to the issue, both positions aspire to
a certainty that is inconsistent with fair and practical implementation.
The pure libertarian perspective dismisses the real impact of loosely
restricted political money on those with minimal resources and on the
quality of American politics. The pure egalitarian position fails to
appreciate that excessive restriction on the use of political money
infringes upon the liberty of all, and deadens political participation to
the detriment of society as a whole (e.g., a complete prohibition on the
use of private funds for political purposes would outlaw even the pur-
chase of a posterboard to make a sign criticizing the government).
Many attempts to reconcile these two competing principles in concrete
contexts have led to conceptual inconsistencies, such as the determi-
nation that "immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form"" corrupt the electoral system
when they originate from a corporation's general treasury, but not
when they come from the salary of the corporation's chief executive
officer. 5 Such a myopic focus on individual rights (whether they be
absolute or uniform rights) effectively overlooks important concerns
that impact democratic structure. For example, incumbent political
power can find significant opportunities for entrenchment both in a
12. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 11, at 1215-18; Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for De-
mocracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1, 30 (1996); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 273, 278-79 (1993); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the
First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 609, 625-31 (1982).
13. See Edward B. Foley, Philosophy, the Constitution, and Campaign Finance, 10 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 23, 23 (1998) ('Two starkly different visions dominate contemporary debates about
campaign finance reform. The egalitarian vision wants limits on the amount of money spent on
election campaigns in an effort to equalize the financial influence of all voters in the electoral
process. The libertarian vision opposes such limits on the ground that they would interfere with
the freedom of voters to use their own money to publicize their political views.").
14. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
15. See id. at 665.
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system with few limitations on political money and in a system man-
dating that the worth of political money be made uniform for every
person.
Neither Buckley's emphasis on First Amendment liberty nor
prominent alternatives that interpret the First Amendment to require
equality in the use of political money effectively capture the complex-
ity of the issues raised by political money. Recognizing these short-
comings, as well as the fact that unlike traditional speech, regulation
of political money does not self-evidently fall under control of the First
Amendment, alternative approaches in determining the appropriate
judicial treatment of political money deserve exploration. In particu-
lar, it could be helpful to inquire whether there are any other liberty
interests mentioned in constitutional provisions that may be applica-
ble to political money. Another constitutionally protected liberty that
is connected to political money (at least as clearly as speech appears to
be) might implicate a standard of judicial review that is better suited
to the characteristics of political money.
This Article proposes that the Due Process and Takings
Clauses (together the "Property Clauses") of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments are at least as (if not more) applicable to political money
as the First Amendment. Such an application would enhance the
authority of Congress and state and local legislatures over political
money, as courts, in interpreting the Property Clauses, generally
allow for broad legislative regulation of property and economic trans-
actions ' in areas as varied as minimum wage," antitrust," zoning,"
rent control,' and environmental law."1 Political money possesses
many of the traits that explain judicial doctrines that permit broad
legislative authority over property, and lacks some of the traits that
most strongly make the case for strict protection of speech. Doctrines
equating political money regulation with speech regulation have failed
to make these comparisons. The differences between our understand-
ings of speech and property that have seemed to account for entrust-
ing the legislature with a much wider discretion to regulate property
16. Economic liberties, or freedom in "choices and modes of productive activity and invest-
ment," are sometimes distinguished from proprietary liberties, or freedom in "retention, use, and
disposition of lawfully obtained holdings of wealth." Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values,
and Constitutional Method, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 91, 95 (1992). In this Article, however, unless
explicitly provided, these terms will be used interchangeably.
17. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
18. See, e.g., National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 129 (1905).
19. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-90 (1926).
20. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921).
21. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981).
2000] 1239
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may similarly favor entrusting the legislature with a substantial
amount of authority with regard to political money.
As opposed to committing the campaign finance question im-
practically to either fixed principles of liberty or equality within the
constitutional sphere, treating political money more like property
would allow legislatures to make informed policy judgments about
political money tailored to real, context-specific problems without
being committed to either a dogmatic and destructive absolutism or an
impossible and dull uniformity. Thinking of political money as prop-
erty-like in some respects could allow for a legal system that main-
tains due respect for both the liberties of those with political money
and other weighty societal interests, such as widespread participa-
tion! and limiting the political influence of wealth. This approach
resolves the inadequacies (whether through constitutional libertarian
or egalitarian perspectives) of heavy-handed judicial constraints on
the regulation of political money by moving the debate to the more
suitable political arena.' Rather than supporting or condemning any
particular strategy of reform, judicial treatment that appreciates the
property characteristics of political money would provide greater
respect for democratic debate and decisions with regard to political
money.
As mentioned above, in his concurring opinion in Shrink, Jus-
tice Stevens agreed that constitutional property considerations are
relevant when analyzing restrictions on political money, and that
property is not entitled to the same protection as speech, stating:
Money is property; it is not speech... Our Constitution and our heritage properly pro-
tect the individual's interest in making decisions about the use of his or her own prop-
erty. Governmental regulation of such decisions can sometimes be viewed either as
"deprivations of liberty" or as "deprivations of property," . . . . Telling a grandmother
that she may not use her own property to provide shelter to a grandchild-or to hire
mercenaries to work in that grandchild's campaign for public office-raises important
constitutional concerns that are unrelated to the First Amendment... The right to use
one's own money to hire gladiators, or to fund "speech by proxy," certainly merits sig-
nificant constitutional protection. These property rights, however, are not entitled to
the same protection as the right to say what one pleases.
24
22. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 911 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring,
joined by Ginsburg, J.) ("[Contribution limitations] seek to build public confidence... and
broaden the base of a candidate's meaningful financial support, encouraging the public participa-
tion and open discussion that the First Amendment itself presupposes.").
23. Cf. Foley, supra note 11, at 1210-11 (arguing, using a theory of majoritarian interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment, that the campaign finance egalitariantlibertarian debate is an
issue for legislative resolution).
24. Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 910 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The concurrence
by Justice Stevens could also be read as resurrecting (or acknowledging a resurrection of)
1240 [Vol. 53:1235
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While this Article acknowledges that judicial approaches to-
ward political money regulations could benefit from borrowing con-
cepts from property doctrines, the Article differs from the Stevens con-
currence in that it does not simply categorize political money as prop-
erty and propose that regulations of political money be treated like
property regulations exclusively.' Rather, this Article contends that
courts should consider both speech doctrine and property doctrine in
developing a new way to look at campaign finance.
Showing that political money is no less appropriately regulated
as property than as speech exposes larger concerns. If there are justi-
fiable reasons for entrusting more of the boundary-drawing between
individual liberties and societal interests to legislatures in some areas
(such as property), but reserving that responsibility to courts in other
areas (such as speech), how should matters in the intersection be
resolved? Why, when constitutional categories and doctrines overlap
in the political money context, should courts apply the most exacting
scrutiny required by the First Amendment? Does a court oversimplify
the matter when it ignores the intersection and selects as controlling
the form of judicial treatment that more stringently scrutinizes legis-
lative regulation? Why should the law choose to apply only one scheme
rather than recognizing the intricacies of the issue at hand? This
Article will sketch out one possible response to these questions and
apply it in the campaign finance context.
In short, this Article challenges Buckley's limitation on legisla-
tive discretion that treats regulations of political money like regula-
tions of speech. The Article acknowledges the speech/property distinc-
heightened constitutional protection to certain exercises of property rights pursuant to substan-
tive due process. Stevens writes that "property and liberty concerns adequately explain the
Court's decision to invalidate the expenditure limitations in the 1974 Act. Reliance on the First
Amendment to justify the invalidation of campaign finance regulations is the functional equiva-
lent of the Court's candid reliance on the doctrine of substantive due process." Id. In support of
this position, Stevens cites his concurrence in a 1977 case in which he argued that a single-
family occupancy zoning ordinance prohibiting a woman from living with her two grandchildren
(who were cousins rather than siblings) constituted a taking of property without due process.
See id.; Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("In my
judgment the critical question.., is whether East Cleveland's housing ordinance is a permissible
restriction on appellant's right to use her own property as she sees fit."). This Article disagrees
with Stevens insofar as he means to assert that Buckley's respect of contribution limits and
invalidation of spending limitations would be warranted under judicial doctrine protecting
generic property and liberty rights. This Article does not entertain heightened judicial protec-
tion for certain uses of property (e.g., political expenditures) under the Property Clauses, but
rather accepts dominant norms regarding property and speech as background assumptions, and
reconsiders the proper constitutional treatment of political money in the context of these back-
ground assumptions. See infra note 82.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 207-209 (explaining important differences between
property and political money).
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tion in constitutional legal doctrine, the reasons behind it, and the
implications of these reasons upon the allocation of authority between
courts and legislatures with regard to political money. Courts should
acknowledge that political money has characteristics of both speech
and property, and give greater respect to legislative decisions in this
area by treating regulations of political money more like (but not
exactly like) regulations of property.
Part I of this Article discusses Buckley's application of the First
Amendment to political money, and describes the different judicial
treatment accorded speech and property interests. Part II introduces
the Article's framework for analyzing political money, and distin-
guishes it from those who argue that the marketplace of ideas is
similar to the economic marketplace in ways that warrant a wider
berth for speech regulation than the Court currently allows. Parts III
and IV make two claims about political money's crucial similarities to
property and differences from speech. First, judicial respect for legisla-
tive authority in regulating property is best accounted for by recogni-
tion of concerns about scarcity, distribution, and interference with
others' interests that also appear in the political money context. Sec-
ond, while the principle of distrust of incumbent power is applicable in
both the speech and political money contexts, the protection of politi-
cal money from regulation has consequences that differ from those
that stem from the protection of speech from regulation. Judicial pro-
tection for speech effectively prevents incumbents and ruling political
groups from using their authority to regulate speech in a manner that
favors themselves and entrenches their own power. Immunization of
political money from most restrictions is different, however, as it en-
hances the ability of entrenchment-minded ruling officials and groups
to increase their political power by manipulating any lawmaking that
has economic implications. Part V considers both property and speech
doctrines in proposing a judicial approach that simultaneously re-
spects democratic decision-making while guarding against unfair en-
trenchment by incumbent officials and ruling political groups.
1242 [Vol. 53:1235
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I. BUCKLEYAND JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF LIBERTY INTERESTS
A. Judicial Protection of Expressive Liberties May Vary
Buckley, the seminal case concerning political money,"6 involved
a challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974 (the "1974 Act').2 The 1974 Act, although "technically a set of
amendments to the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act... stands as
the most comprehensive reform of the campaign finance system ever
adopted,"' and included limitations on campaign contributions and
expenditures.' With regard to contributions, the 1974 Act prohibited
an individual from giving more than $100030 to a particular candidate
26. Extensive debate has occurred regarding the validity of Buckley's distinction between
restrictions on the act of spending money for political purposes and restrictions on the act of
contributing money directly to a political candidate or committee. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 45-47 (1976) (per curiam); Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 903-05. For different perspectives of the
debate, see, for example, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261-62 (White, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (proposing that courts give greater deference to expenditure limits, treating them
more like contribution limits), and Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S.
604, 635-40 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that courts
should apply greater scrutiny to contribution limits, treating them like expenditure limits). The
analysis advanced in this Article applies to both the acts of contributing and spending, and thus
employs the term "political money" to collectively refer to political contributions and expendi-
tures. See infra note 74.
27. See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; see also Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (repealed 1976).
28. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 53 (Anthony Corrado et. al. eds., 1997).
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 'limited personal contributions [by candidates and
their families], established specific ceilings for media expenditures, and required full public
disclosure of campaign receipts and disbursements." Id. at 52. The 1974 Act "significantly
strengthened the disclosure provisions of the 1971 law and enacted unprecedented limits on
contributions and expenditures in federal elections. It introduced the first use of public financ-
ing at the national level... [and created] the Federal Election Commission." Id. at 53.
29. This Article is limited to a discussion of the portion of the 1974 Act concerning campaign
contributions and expenditures. Buckley also invalidated regulatory provisions providing for the
appointment of some FEC commissioners by congressional leaders (based on the separation of
powers doctrine), see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138-41, and upheld disclosure, see id. at 60-84, and
public financing provisions, see id. at 85-109. For important literature providing additional
information on Buckley and the campaign finance dilemma generally, see generally E. JOSHUA
ROSENKRANZ, BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM (1998) (providing Buckley's holding, effects, and problems, and discussing
strategies to overturn Buckley); CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 28
(providing a broad overview of campaign finance controversies, regulations, opinions, and reform
proposals); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 616-64 (1998) (covering major campaign finance cases and issues); DANIEL
HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 507-44 (1995) (covering the contri-
bution and expenditure limit holdings of Buckley); DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L.
HASEN, ELECTION LAW: SUPPLEMENT 1999-2000, at 77-127 (1999) (discussing the Court's
campaign finance jurisprudence).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (modified 1976, recodified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(1)(A) (1994)).
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per election3' and limited an individual's overall contributions to
$25,000 per year.2 The expenditure limitation provisions were as fol-
lows: (1) a $1000 annual ceiling on independent expenditures-expen-
ditures by a non-candidate to promote the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate;33 (2) an annual ceiling on campaign ex-
penditures from a candidate's personal or family funds;' and (3) a
variable ceiling on total campaign expenditures from all sources.
Lawyers defending the 1974 Act argued that three congres-
sional objectives had motivated the law: (a) prevention of corruption
and the appearance of corruption; (b) equalization of influence of citi-
zens; and (c) reduction of barriers to participation in the political
process by potential candidates.' Some commentators suggest that, in
reality, incumbency self-preservation objectives motivated lawmakers
to pass the 1974 Act.3
In Buckley, the primary question in determining the standard
of scrutiny to apply to the 1974 Act was whether contribution and ex-
penditure limitations directly burdened speech, or whether they had
merely an incidental effect on speech. Under established doctrine, a
finding of a direct burden on speech would subject the 1974 Act to the
most stringent scrutiny, which invalidates all laws that fail to serve
compelling governmental interests by the least restrictive means. 9
Conversely, a determination that contribution and expenditure limita-
tions only incidentally affected speech would mean that the 1974 Act
would be constitutional if it contributed substantially to an important
governmental interest unrelated to suppression of free expression and
if its restriction on expression was no greater than essential to further
the interest.' For example, laws directed at restricting conduct like
31. An election may refer to either a primary or general election, and thus the 1974 Act
limits contributions to $1,000 for the primary election and $1,000 for the general election. See
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24.
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1974) (modified 1976, recodified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(3)) (1994).
33. See id. § 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976).
34. See id. § 608(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976).
35. See id. § 608(c) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976).
36. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976) (per curiam).
37. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment
and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1076-81 (1985); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty
Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049,
1072-75 (1996).
38. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
39. See id. at 14-23, 44-45.
40. See id. at 16 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)).
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the burning of draft cards41 and reasonable "time, place, and manner"
limitations on picketing" or the use of a sound truck,43 are not subject
to strict scrutiny."
Several commentators have argued that political money is inci-
dentally related to speech, and thus the less demanding standard of
scrutiny should be used in reviewing regulation of political money.
They notably include Judge J. Skelly Wright, who served on the en
banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit that considered the Buckley case prior to the Supreme Court
hearing4" and wrote a widely noticed article on the issue." Judge
Wright claimed that campaign money is a mere "vehicle for political
expression," and that "[r]estrictions on the use of money should be
judged by the tests employed for vehicles-for speech-related con-
duct-and not by the tests developed for pure speech."4 7 He asserted
that the 1974 Act was directed at the giving and spending itself,
rather than the communication that could be bought with the money.8
Congress, Judge Wright argued, wanted a "straightforward regulation
of the excessive use of money as a blight on the political process," 9 and
"was unconcerned with the type or quantity of speech that might
result' under the new limits. Judge Wright further noted that a gift
of money, by itself, does not express any ascertainable content or
41. The speech/conduct distinction was introduced in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968). O'Brien involved a war protester convicted for violating a statute that prohibited the
burning of draft cards. See id. at 369. Despite the defendant's claims that he was engaging in
political expression in burning his draft card, the Court sustained the conviction, holding that
O'Brien's act was not pure speech and that an important governmental interest was advanced by
the protection of draft cards. See id. at 377-81. The Court recognized that "when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important [as
opposed to compelling] governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376.
42. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611 (1968); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
43. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
44. The Court in Buckley found this lower standard inapplicable to political money restric-
tions because the 1974 Act, rather than regulating the manner of speech, imposed "direct
quantity restrictions" that limited the "extent" of political communication. Buckley, 424 U.S. at
18 & n.17.
45. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that restrictions on political
giving and spending were constitutional. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831-32 (1975), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Judge Wright wrote at least part of the per curiam
opinion issued. See Wright, supra note 12, at 645.
46. See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution." Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001
(1976).
47. Id. at 1007.
48. See id. at 1008.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1008 n.36.
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viewpoint,5' and is also an ineffective expression of intensity of support
since contributors have varied economic standings in life, and those of
differing wealth incur differing levels of sacrifice in making equal
monetary contributions." While Judge Wright acknowledged that
there are "delicate links" between campaign money and speech that
necessitate careful judicial review, he warned that it is a mistake to
analyze the problem using a "blunderbuss formula that equates money
and speech."
5 3
In contrast, the Buckley Court strongly rejected the notion that
giving and spending political money could be severed from the most
urgent objectives of the First Amendment.' To the Court, the fact that
a communication was produced by money did not alter its significance
as a communication, or dilute a "'pure form of expression."'" The ac-
tivity of supplying money to pay for the production or dissemination of
political messages was too directly connected to First Amendment
values and objectives to be described merely as incidental "conduct
'intertwined with expression."'" The Court stated that:
Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of money in-
volve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of
the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication
on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to re-
duce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.5 7
The Court reasoned that in modern society "television, radio, and
other mass media" were "indispensable instruments of effective politi-
cal speech!" and made "the raising of large sums of money an ever
more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy."' In the Court's
view, the 1974 Act did not merely burden speech incidentally as a
time, place, and manner restriction or other regulation directed at
conduct might because "the Act's dollar ceilings restrict[ed] the extent
of the reasonable use of virtually every means of communicating in-
formation."' Contrary to popular opinion, Buckley's initial application
of speech doctrine to regulations of political money is not based on the
51. See id. at 1009.
52. See id. at 1014.
53. Id. at 1010.
54. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam).
55. Id. at 17 (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965).
56. Id. (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965)).
57. Id. at 16.
58. Id. at 19.
59. Id. at 26.
60. Id. at 18 n.17 (emphasis added).
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logic that "money is speech" (spending is the same thing as speaking).61
Rather, Buckley's application of speech doctrine was premised on the
rationale that money is so strictly necessary to "effective political
speech 6 2 that a restriction on money effectively constitutes a restric-
tion on speech.' By analogy, although consuming gas is a different
activity than driving a car, a restriction on gas consumption necessar-
ily limits how far one can drive.'
In applying "rigorous" First Amendment scrutiny, the Court
upheld the $1000 contribution limits, determining such limits had less
of an effect on First Amendment liberties and adequately served gov-
ernmental interests of preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption.' The Court invalidated the three expenditure limitation
provisions, however, reasoning that they more directly burdened First
Amendment liberties and that unlimited expenditures did not pose the
same danger of corruption as contributions.'
61. A number of commentators have interpreted Buckley as equating money with speech.
See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilem-
mas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1277 (1994); Debra Burke, Twenty Years after the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974: Look Who's Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REV. 357, 370
(1995); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 389 (1990); Alan B. Morrison, What If... Buckley Were
Overturned?, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 347, 369-70 (1999).
62. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
63. See id. at 26; see also ROSENKRANZ, supra note 29, at 32.
64. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18 ("Being free to engage in unlimited political expression
subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as
one desires on a single tank of gasoline.').
65. See id. at 26-29. There exists a split among the circuits regarding the appropriate judi-
cial standard of review for contribution limits. One perspective interprets Buckley as requiring
the application of strict scrutiny to both contribution and expenditure limits, and as finding that
limits advanced the state's compelling interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption in the
contribution context but not in the expenditure context. See, e.g., Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d
563, 567-68 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 510 (1998) (expressly rejecting a lower standard of
review and applying strict scrutiny in analyzing contribution limits on contributions). The
alternative perspective, relying upon Buckley's statement that expenditure limits burden
freedoms of political expression and association more extensively that contribution limits asserts
that the Buckley Court applied a slightly lower standard of scrutiny to limitations on contribu-
tions. See, e.g., Vannatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 870 (1999) (applying "rigorous, rather than strict, scrutiny" in reviewing contribution limits).
This Article proposes a different analysis-specifically, that in reviewing the regulation of
political money (whether contributions or expenditures), the Court should consider the purposes
of judicial protection of speech and deference to property regulation, and take actions that are
consistent with these purposes. In other words, courts should not mechanically protect political
money from regulation simply because speech is protected from regulation, for the results of
protecting political money may run counter to the objectives of immunizing speech. See infra
Part II.A.
66. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-48 (reasoning that expenditures involving quid pro quo
would necessarily involve coordination with the candidate, and would thus be treated as contri-
butions and limited to $1000); see also id. at 39-59 (discussing and invalidating expenditure
limitations). It is also worth noting that the Court in Buckley believed that contribution limits
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Twenty-four years later in Shrink, the Court acknowledged
that the Buckley opinion was unclear in articulating the standard of
scrutiny to be applied in reviewing contribution limits.67 The Shrink
Court responded by interpreting Buckley as reviewing contribution
limits with a standard more stringent than intermediate scrutiny but
"different" from the strict scrutiny applied by expenditure limits."
The Shrink Court described "Buckley's standard of scrutiny"' as re-
quiring that a contribution restriction be "'closely drawn' to match a
'sufficiently important interest.' ... After finding that the prevention
of corruption and the appearance of corruption constituted govern-
imposed special burdens upon the First Amendment freedom of political association. See id. at
24-25. According to the Shrink Court, Buckley did not "attempt to parse distinctions between the
speech and association standards of scrutiny," but "proceeded on the understanding that a
contribution limitation surviving a claim of associational abridgement would survive a speech
challenge as well." Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 904. This Article compares proprietary liberties to
expressive liberties generally rather than associational liberties in particular. Many of the
assertions advanced in this Article regarding expressive liberties, however, are applicable to
associational liberties (e.g., a purpose of judicial protection of both is to prevent incumbent
political power from entrenching itself by curtailing the exercise of these liberties), perhaps due
to the close relation between First Amendment expressive and associational liberties. See
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) ("[T]he Court has recognized a right
to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-
speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion."); Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 88 ('To the Court, the
freedom of association has meaning only when the association's participants are attempting to
accomplish an objective independently protected by the freedom of speech."); Sally Frank, The
Key to Unlocking the Clubhouse Door, 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 27, 59 n.146 (1994) ('The concept
of freedom of association for expressive purposes derives from the freedom of speech and free-
dom of assembly clauses of the First Amendment of the Constitution.").
67. See Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 903 ("Precision about the relative rigor of the standard to re-
view contribution limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per curiam opinion.'). Prior to Shrink,
there was a split among the circuits regarding the appropriate judicial standard of review for
contribution limits. One perspective interpreted Buckley as requiring the application of strict
scrutiny to both contribution and expenditure limits, and as finding that limits advanced the
state's compelling interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption in the contribution context but
not in the expenditure context. See, e.g., Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 567-68 (8th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 510 (1998) (expressly rejecting a lower standard of review and applying
strict scrutiny in analyzing contribution limits on contributions). The alternative perspective,
relying upon Buckley's statement that expenditure limits burden freedoms of political expression
and association more extensively than contribution limits, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23, asserts that
the Buckley Court applied a slightly lower standard of scrutiny to limitations on contributions.
See, e.g., Vannatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
870 (1999) (applying "rigorous, rather than strict, scrutiny" in reviewing contribution limits).
68. Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 903-04.
69. Id. at 904.
70. Id. at 904 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). Justice Thomas contended that the Shrink
majority did not clarify Buckley's standard for reviewing contribution limits, but diluted it. See
id. at 924 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.) ("In refashioning Buckley, the Court then
goes on to weaken the requisite precision in tailoring, while at the same time representing that
its fiat 'do[es] not relax Buckley's standard.'").
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ment interests that were sufficiently important to justify contribution
limits,"' the Shrink Court stated that contribution limits should be
deemed too low if they "impede the ability of candidates to 'amass the
resources necessary for effective advocacy.""
Although the judicial standards applied to contribution limits
and expenditure limits may differ, both involve upper levels of First
Amendment scrutiny and focus on the effect of the limits on speech
while ignoring relevant property doctrines. Consequently, this Arti-
cle's analysis applies to both political contributions as well as expendi-
tures," and to Buckley as well as its progeny (including Shrink, which
interprets rather than overturns Buckley).
B. Judicial Protection Varies From Speech to Property
While Buckley applied high standards of scrutiny to review re-
strictions on political money, legislative regulations of liberty interests
generally warrant various types of judicial treatment. Lawyers clas-
sify various liberty interests "by function" for, as the liberty interests
differ, the understanding of what a person should (or should not) be
71. The Shrink Court did not define "corruption" as limited to quid pro quo arrangements,
but also "extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors." Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 905.
72. Id. at 909 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21) (internal brackets omitted). The proper in-
quiry asks "whether the contribution limitation was so radical in effect as to render political
association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render
contributions pointless." Id. at 909.
73. Despite the fact that contributions, unlike expenditures, can be limited, the analysis
advanced in this Article is applicable to political contributions. Although the current application
of First Amendment strict scrutiny to expenditure limits may be more absolute and unreason-
able than the "rigorous" standard applied to contribution limits, both tests are confined to an
upper level First Amendment framework that overlooks constitutional property doctrines and
severely limits legislative discretion. The Court's analysis of contribution limits continues to be
focused on the effect the Court perceives the particular limit has upon speech, and fails to
consider the property characteristics of contributions that justify judicial deference to restric-
tions (e.g., scarcity, uneven distribution, and interference). See infra Part II. Consequently, a
$250 contribution limitation that burdens the speech of the wealthy would be invalidated, even
in the face of legislative findings suggesting that a $250 limit is needed to address problems
stemming from the uneven distribution of political money (e.g., absent a $250 limit, officials
would pander almost exclusively to the wealthy class of individuals who give most of the $1,000
contributions). Rather than focusing solely on the effect on speech in either the contribution or
expenditure limitation context, this Article proposes that in reviewing the regulation of political
money (whether contributions or expenditures), the Court should consider the purposes of
judicial protection of speech and deference to property regulation, and take actions that are
consistent with these purposes. In other words, courts should not mechanically protect political
money from regulation simply because speech is protected from regulation, for the results of
protecting political money may run counter to the objectives of immunizing speech. See infra
Part II.A.
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free to do in her various field of application also differs."4 For example,
expressive liberties correspond to an individual's interest in "freedom
from government control over what they say and over how, when, and
where they say it."7" Proprietary liberties, on the other hand, are com-
monly understood as an individual's interest in freedom from govern-
ment control over her acquisition, "retention, use, and disposition of
lawfully obtained holdings of wealth."76
It is also clear that, in contemplating lawmaking, the Consti-
tution very purposefully "entrusts to lawmakers a range of legislative
discretion" to secure and promote sundry public and common objec-
tives, such as securing the social and economic conditions required for
everyone's enjoyment of constitutionally recognized liberties.77
Recognizing the tension inherent in the Constitution's simulta-
neous concern for individual rights and contemplation of lawmaking,
courts are charged with interpreting and implementing the Consti-
tution's intentions about how the lines are to be drawn between these
two classes of objectives.78 Courts have devised various "tests" and
"levels of scrutiny" to aid them in their implementation of what they
believe the Constitution intends with regard to this balancing.' These
tools have been created by courts to both constrain judicial power from
infringing upon the discretion entrusted to the legislature by the
Constitution, and give notice to society generally as to how courts will
implement the Constitution. While these judicially created devices
include standards of review (e.g., rational basis, intermediate, and
strict scrutiny), they also include tools used to ascertain which stan-
dard of review to apply, such as the direct/incidental test discussed in
Buckley.
In determining the proper standard of review to apply, courts
also take into consideration their perception of the type of liberty
interest to be regulated. For example, courts afford the public law-
making process much more discretion in regulating property than in
regulating speech.' Indeed, while speech is occasionally permissibly
74. See Michelman, supra note 16, at 94.
75. Id. at 95.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 93.
78. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing The Constitution, 111 HARv. L. REV.
54, 57 (1997).
79. See id. at 67, 74-75.
80. In order to survive judicial scrutiny, direct restrictions of political speech must be nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, whereas the state's regulation of property
interests must, at most, only substantially advance a legitimate state interest. See Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) (suggesting that the public
lawmaking process has broader regulatory discretion over personal property than real property
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regulated (e.g., laws that incidentally burden speech) and regulation
of property is occasionally deemed excessive (e.g., a regulatory taking),
these instances only support the proposition that judicial treatment is
somewhat situation-specific, and do not negate the existence of the
broader dispositions with regard to judicial treatment of speech and
property.8' As Dean Kathleen Sullivan explains:
There are whole categories of speech that have been excluded from First Amendment
protection-for example, incitement, obscenity, and fighting words. But the Lochner
regime also carved out large exceptions, permitting regulation of transactions "affected
with a public interest," or of women's hours at work. These exceptions did not obscure
the libertarian tendency of the Lochner Court. True, too, the Court upholds many con-
tent-neutral laws against First Amendment challenge even though they may in prac-
tice decrease the amount or tilt the direction of speech. But the Court places far greater
burdens on government to defend such laws than it does in the realm of economic
regulation. Thus, these qualifications do not defeat the generalization that modern
constitutional law employs opposite assumptions for the speech and economic orders.82
under the .Takings Clause); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (holding that content-based
restrictions on political speech must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 & n.3 (1987) (explaining that while economic
regulations satisfy substantive due process if they are rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, land-use property regulation must substantially advance legitimate state interests to
comply with the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech
and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 950 (1995) ("Modem constitutional law... treats
speech as presumptively immune from regulation that is broadly permitted in the economic
sphere.').
81. The framework employed in this Article uses dominant norms related to property and
speech to examine the nature of political money, and thus mirrors Buckley's understanding of a
First Amendment that disfavors government regulation of political speech, as well as the com-
mon belief that the public lawmaking process has wide discretion with regard to regulating
proprietary liberties. Commentators generally accept these propositions, but most would be
inclined to qualify them (e.g., property is sometimes protected, speech is occasionally regulated).
While the distinctions highlighted below may be too broad for some purposes (and may appear
intentionally overstated), they are useful when employed for the specific task of examining
political money in light of the functional similarities and distinctions between property and
speech that may explain the disparate judicial treatment of those two liberty interests. Indeed,
by taking into account both property and speech, this analysis is more comprehensive than a
framework that simply compares political money to regulated types of speech and unregulated
types of speech, or regulated property and unregulated property. Further, some commentators
will probably strenuously object to the legitimacy of current judicial treatment of regulations of
property and speech, arguing either for an escalation in the level of judicial protection for
property, see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 41, 41-43 (1992), or greater judicial respect of legislative authority in regulating speech, see,
e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1407 (1986). Rather
than engaging in extended debate as to whether existing jurisprudence regarding speech and
property should be changed, this Article adopts these dominant norms as background assump-
tions. Cf. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 59 n.8 (1984) (de-
fending the methodology of using dominant norms as tools in functional analysis).
82. Sullivan, supra note 80, at 951 (citations omitted).
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II. SPEECH VS. PROPERTY
The different degrees of protection given to speech and prop-
erty have varied historically, with judicial protection of speech from
regulation and judicial respect for property regulation simultaneously
unfolding only within the last 65 years.' As evidenced by the evolving
nature of the standards themselves, they are dictated not by the spe-
cific text of the Constitution,' but rather by judicial perceptions of the
functions in society of the particular liberty interests regulated and of
the distinct institutional capacities of the judicial and legislative
branches.' Courts, noticing that exercises of different classes of liber-
ties have different kinds of social consequences, find it prudent to
respond to these functional differences by fitting the classes with cus-
tomized "forms and degrees of protection."'
The particular functional differences that explain the disparate
judicial treatment of property regulations and speech regulations can
help determine the proper treatment for regulations of political
money.87 Specifically, issues of scarcity, distribution, and interference
83. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 388-92 (discussing the academic and jurisprudential evolution
toward the regulation of economic and property interests); Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First
Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign
Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1318-24 (1983) (addressing the jurisprudential evolution
toward absolutism in the speech context).
84. See Sullivan, supra note 80, at 951 ('It cannot be that the two different constitutional
regimes simply spring grammatically or logically from different pieces of constitutional text.').
85. See Fallon, supra note 78, at 62 (stating that 'in shaping constitutional tests, the Su-
preme Court must take account of empirical, predictive, and institutional considerations that
may vary from time to time.'); cf. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 166-90
(1993) (explaining how cultural commitments and political theory structure courts' perceptions of
interests). There is no sharp, conclusive definition of either speech or property, or how those
possessing these liberty interests should be able to exercise them. Certainly, speech and prop-
erty (and political money) are what courts consciously perceive them to be. These perceptions
are not stagnant but fluid (even those currently outside of the jurisdiction of the legislature, such
as speech), ever-changing, and based not only on "government action narrowly conceived," but
also on the information obtained and the events occurring in the world, including legal changes.
Id. at 168.
86. Michelman, supra note 16, at 95.
87. Others have argued that the differences in the judicial treatment of economic and ex-
pressive liberties are justified by their distinct functional characteristics. In particular, the
argument has been used to criticize Professor Richard Epstein's proposal that judicial protection
of property from regulation be escalated to the level of speech protection. See, e.g., id. at 95, 99-
105 (responding to Epstein, supra note 81, at 41-43). Commentators have also employed the
argument in objecting to calls for greater judicial respect of legislative authority in regulating
speech. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 80, at 959-64; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48
SMU L. REV. 203, 213-14 (1994); Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship
Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 266-80 (1996). While prior commentators have emphasized the
functional differences between property and speech to critique those that call for a collapse in the
1252
2000] MISTAKEN IDENTITY 1253
with others' interests explain judicial respect for legislative interven-
tion in the property context and warrant similar judicial treatment of
regulations of political money.' Further, judicial protection of speech
is motivated in significant part by the threat of entrenchment by self-
interested incumbent political powers, and this threat is not avoided
by immunization of political money from legislative limits.89
A. A Functional Framework
In comparing political money to any liberty interest, one must
first identify the norm (or norms) explaining why courts treat laws
affecting that liberty interest in a particular manner, for courts ought
to treat political money similarly only if political money is similar to
that liberty interest in the pertinent respects.' For example, in com-
paring speech and political money, one must ask why courts restrict
legislative discretion in regulating speech, and approach laws regu-
lating political money in the same manner only if political money is
relevantly similar to speech in light of the purposes of restraining
legislative discretion.91 Similarly, in comparing political money to
property, one must initially determine the reasons courts generally
respect decisions of the public lawmaking process with regard to prop-
erty, and should consider applying a similar analysis only if political
money is relevantly similar to property.9"
distinct judicial treatment of property regulation and speech regulation, this Article accepts
these functional distinctions and uses them to construct a framework in which to ascertain the
proper judicial treatment of regulations of a third interest, political money. This methodology
provides a new way of considering Buckley.
88. See infra Part EI.
89. See infra Part IV.
90. See Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1326, 1332 (1994) (asserting that effective comparisons require a consideration of norms "encom-
passing both the central case and its putative extension); cf. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reason-
ing: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Reasoning by Analogy, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 923, 994-96 (1996) (explaining that one must often look to the purposes of a rule to deter-
mine whether it is applicable); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV.
741, 774 (1993) ("Everything is a little bit similar to, or different from, everything else .... At
the very least one needs a set of criteria to engage in analogical reasoning. Otherwise one has no
idea what is analogous to what.').
91. See Schauer, supra note 90, at 1332. Commentators have attempted to use the First
Amendment to protect a wide range of activities outside of literal "speech." For example, Tho-
mas Emerson explicitly displaces the term "speech" with the broader term "expression." See
generally THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970). The linguistic
shift, however, does not remove the need to explain why a particular activity is "entitled to
absolute immunity from state control." Epstein, supra note 81, at 60-61.
92. One could certainly argue that there exists no need to compare political money and
property, as case law has already established that money is property. See, e.g., Phillips v.
Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding that interest earned in client trust
accounts is private property for Takings Clause purposes). The observation that some cases have
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Conversely, if there are normative differences between prop-
erty and speech that are irrelevant to the reasons that courts ap-
proach regulations of property and speech with different degrees of
respect, they are probably less helpful in determining which institu-
tion should have primary authority over political money. 3 For exam-
ple, Thomas Emerson associates various values with speech, includ-
ing: (1) the "attainment of truth" acquired "by considering all facts and
arguments which can be put forth in behalf of or against any proposi-
tion;"94 and (2) "participation in decision-making through a process of
open discussion which is available to all members of the community.""9
While these values are central to the essence of speech, neither neces-
sarily explains judicial protection of speech from regulation. Certainly,
one could argue that Emerson's attainment of truth value is fully
realized only when all of the facts (or as many as possible) are on the
table, and that this goal can best be furthered by state restriction on
the speech of those with loud voices so that the perspectives of those
with faint voices may be heard. Similarly, one could argue that gov-
ernment should restrict the speech of those with loud voices so that
those with faint voices can also meaningfully participate in democratic
decision-making. The characteristics of speech and property that are
unrelated to which institution should have primary authority over
political money are not particularly helpful in this analysis.' On the
treated money like property, however, does not cut to the heart of the question of judicial treat-
ment of political money. Dicta that money is property does not, by itself, take into account the
general characteristics of money that explain regulation, and the existence of these identical
characteristics in the particular context of political money. In short, a judicial opinion stating
that "money is property" is as deficient for the purposes of this Article as a case stating that
"money is speech."
93. Cf. Schauer, supra note 90, at 1333-35. In addition to scarcity, uneven distribution, and
unfair interference with others' interests, political money and property are connected by a
number of other characteristics related to possession, exclusive control, and transferability. For
example, an ownership interest enforced by government prevents non-owners from freely using
political money and other types of property without the consent of owners (e.g. "money is speech"
is unlikely to be a successful defense for one charged with embezzling $50,000 from a corporate
PAC), whereas there is generally no need for government to prevent others from using a
speaker's speech (unless it is described as intellectual "property"). Additionally, the power
associated with political money and other types of property can be meaningfully transferred from
one person to another. A more extensive exploration of these similarities and differences may
provide further insight into the proper judicial treatment of regulations of political money. This
Article, however, focuses on the characteristics that appear to be the most relevant in explaining
why courts give more respect to restrictions of property (scarcity, distribution, and interference).
94. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 881 (1963).
95. Id. at 882. Professor Emerson's other values of speech are self-fulfillment and the main-
tenance of a stable community through interaction and exchange. See id. at 878-79.
96. As discussed throughout this Article, institutional considerations are relevant in re-
solving the question of whether the main control over political money belongs more appropriately
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other hand, factors related to judicial protection of liberty interests
from the public lawmaking process, such as special distrust of incum-
bent legislators and democratic majorities tempted to manipulate
speech regulation to entrench their own political power, might be
valuable in explaining judicial treatment that minimizes legislative
authority over speech.
In short, the normative differences between speech and prop-
erty that explain different judicial treatment of the two must be ex-
amined in order to gain meaningful insights into how courts should
review regulations of political money. The observation that political
money can be used to buy television commercials and other types of
"effective" speech, by itself, insufficiently explains protection of politi-
cal money from regulation. One of the shortcomings of Buckley is that
the Court failed to adequately ascertain the reasons speech is pro-
tected and analyze whether the characteristics of political money were
such that the protection of political money from regulation similarly
furthered these objectives.
B. Free Spending and Regulation of Speech
Others have argued that speech markets, like economic mar-
kets, occasionally malfunction and require regulation. Just as their
predecessors rejected the existing distribution and formal judicial pro-
tection of economic and proprietary liberties during the Lochner era,97
these commentators (hereinafter the "Speech Realists") reject the
naturalness and near absolute judicial protection of expressive liber-
ties.98 In its place, they generally assert that the ideal of freedom of
within the domain of majoritarian lawmaking (like property) or judicial interpretation of the
Constitution (like speech). In determining the proper judicial treatment of regulations of
political money, it is worthwhile to keep in mind the legitimacy of democratic decision-making,
the independence of judicial decision-making, the fact-finding capacities particular to each
institution, and other institutional considerations that might prompt the assignment of authority
over speech to the courts and over property to the public lawmaking process. See Schauer, supra
note 90, at 1337-39.
97. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905) (reasoning that an individual's right
to enter into contracts was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and
was generally immune from interference by the state). Many Lochner-era scholars, most notably
the legal realists, criticized the decision and its progeny, and it was effectively overruled by West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For an extensive discussion of legal realism, see
generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-246 (1992); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 465, 468-503 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960
(1986)).
98. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470, 2481 (1997); Cass
R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 914 (1987).
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speech itself provides a substantial basis for the regulation of speech.
Most of the Speech Realists concentrate not so much on campaign
finance, but more so on First Amendment theory generally. They
apply their provocative arguments to justify regulation of a variety of
speakers, including pornographers, racists, influential corporations,
unions, and broadcast media.99 With regard to political money, the
Speech Realists generally assert that the primary purpose of the First
Amendment is to advance self-government through enlightened public
exchange, and that such exchange necessitates legislative intervention
to ensure that various speakers are heard with a certain amount of
equality.1
®
Certainly, in looking at "state intervention in economic mat-
ters" and using "that historical experience to understand why the
state might have a role to play in furthering free speech values,"'' 1
many of the Speech Realists are a conceptual step away from Buck-
ley's libertarianism and toward the argument made in this Article.
The fundamental approaches of this Article and of the Speech Real-
ists, however, are very different, and lead to distinct results."
99. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL.,
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 167-240 (1993)
(discussing discrimination in free expression); Balkin, supra note 83, at 414-28 (reviewing
harassment and captive audiences); Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism Is Giving
Way to First Amendment Legal Realism, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 171 (1994) (analyzing
language and expression as instruments of positive harm); Fiss, supra note 81, at 1419-25
(addressing state intervention in public debate); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 781, 787-94 (discussing dominance of television networks) (1987) [hereinafter Fiss, Why the
State]; Charles R. Lawrence, II, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Cam-
pus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 449-57 (equating racist speech to fighting words); Frederick Schauer,
Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1343-48 (1992) (arguing for compensation for
costs of free speech); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 263-300
(outlining "new Deal" for speech) (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, Free Speech Now]; Sunstein,
supra note 90, at 914 (providing look at regulation of powerful private speakers).
100. See, e.g., David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign
Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 236, 240 (1991); Fiss, supra note 98, at 2481; Fiss, Why the
State?, supra note 99, at 784-87; Sunstein, Free Speech Now, supra note 99, at 263.
101. Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 99, at 783.
102. The argument advanced in this Article also differs from those that compare the current
system of financing campaigns to laws conditioning political participation on financial payment
or property ownership. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)
(regulation conditioning the right to vote on payment of poll tax violates equal protection);
Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 9, at 1165-65 & n.11 (arguing that the logic of Harper compels a
publicly financed electoral system). But cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976) (rejecting
the argument that Harper allows Congress to regulate political money); Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 726-30 (1973) (concluding that property-
based scheme for electing governing board of water reclamation district does not violate equal
protection).
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Whereas the Speech Realists look to the evolution of jurispru-
dence governed by the Due Process Clause and argue for an analogous
development of First Amendment jurisprudence,1 3 this Article argues
that, due to the nature of political money, it is unclear whether the
First Amendment or the Property Clauses appropriately govern politi-
cal money. Unlike the Speech Realists, this Article questions why
judicial tests associated with the First Amendment automatically
apply to political money to the exclusion of the Property Clauses,
which generally are interpreted differently and implemented by courts
using different tests and standards. This Article does not propose that
the legislature be given unchecked regulatory authority over political
money (a result that some might attribute to the Speech Realists)," as
such a conclusion ignores important First Amendment issues and
constitutes a form of mechanical categorization no better than the
formalism exhibited in Buckley."' The judicial toleration for political
money regulation under this Article's analysis results from appre-
ciating the similar characteristics of political money and property
while simultaneously honing presently diffuse judicial scrutiny so that
it advances the particular concerns that animate protection of speech
(such as prevention of the manipulation of rules of democratic en-
103. See Sullivan, supra note 80, at 959 ("In sum, those who advocate a New Deal for speech
see the 'marketplace of ideas' as analogous to the commercial marketplace'). See, e.g., JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 362 (1993) ('CThe First Amendment no more enjoins a system of
representation according to influence effectively exerted in free political rivalry between une-
quals than the Fourteenth Amendment enjoins a system of liberty of contract and free competi-
tion between unequals in the economy, as the Court thought in the Lochner era."); Sunstein,
supra note 98, at 914 ("[A] wholesale abandonment of Lochner-like premises, requiring courts to
look at the content of speech, would wreak havoc with existing first amendment doctrine-as it
did earlier in the century with private property under the due process clause.').
104. See Sullivan, supra note 80, at 954.
105. Both Buckley and the Speech Realists tend to overlook the distinctions between speech
and property. While Buckley treats personal property spent on speech as so closely connected to
speech as to call for a like form of judicial protection, the Speech Realists analogize the "speech
market" to the economic market in calling for the regulation of various types of speech. For the
most part, Buckley fails to value the importance of issues of scarcity, distribution, and interfer-
ence with others' interests that account for the regulation of property, see infra Part mH, and the
Speech Realists have been criticized for not fully appreciating issues of institutional distrust that
undergird protection for speech. Unlike the Speech Realists or Buckley, this Article does not
downplay differences between speech and property, but rather concentrates on these differences
to ascertain the proper treatment of political money. While this Article, like Judge Wright,
proposes that political money is distinguishable from speech, it also argues that courts should
consider constitutional doctrines other than the First Amendment in determining the judicial
treatment of political money regulations. The Article agrees with the proposal by Justice
Stevens that the Property Clauses are relevant, but departs from the Stevens logic by refusing to
deny the concurrent applicability of the First Amendment. A complete analysis requires an
examination of political money in relation to two different constitutionally governed areas-
speech and property.
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gagement by self-interested incumbents)." As opposed to lowering
protection afforded by the First Amendment to further speech values,
this Article uses the high scrutiny afforded under conventional speech
doctrines and the lower scrutiny associated with the property doc-
trines to create a framework through which to examine the particular
characteristics of political money and devise a more fitting judicial
test. The fundamental differences in the approaches of this Article and
the Speech Realists also trigger a number of other distinctions that
are too numerous to discuss (e.g., whereas Parts IV and V of this Arti-
cle discuss and appreciate the relevance of issues of distrust and en-
trenchment in both the speech and political money contexts, the
Speech Realists have been criticized for failing to adequately appreci-
ate these issues)."
HI. SCARCITY, DISTRIBUTION, AND INTERFERENCE
Perceptions of the ways in which a particular liberty interest
functions in society and the values it serves or signifies may help
explain judicial treatment of regulation of that liberty interest. 8 The
starting point in this analysis, therefore, involves the consideration of
characteristics of property that appear to explain judicial respect for
the legislature's role in regulating property, and a comparison of these
characteristics to those of political money.
A. Scarcity and Distribution
1. Property is Scarce and Unevenly Distributed
Issues related to the scarcity and distribution of property con-
tribute to judicial respect of the legislature's role with regard to the
regulation of property, and the fact that courts do not perceive these
characteristics in the same way in the speech context may explain, in
part, judicial reluctance to provide a similar degree of deference to the
regulation of speech.
Property is scarce. Real property is finite, and while oppor-
tunities to increase the total amount of personal property are being
106. While the Speech Realists look to what they believe to be the primary purpose of speech
itself to justify legislative intervention, this Article examines a primary purpose of protecting
speech from regulation and argues that the purpose is not advanced by protecting political
money from regulation.
107. See Gey, supra note 87, at 277; Sullivan, supra note 80, at 961-62.
108. See Michelman, supra note 16, at 114.
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continuously discovered, individuals have access to, at any one time, a
limited amount of personal property. Issues of scarcity are viewed dif-
ferently in the speech context, however, as speech is not generally per-
ceived as a tangible, finite commodity.'a Rather, opportunities for
people to express themselves appear to be easily accessible and un-
limited.
While speech appears to be naturally available to speakers,"'
people are not naturally endowed with property, but depend upon
others in acquiring it."' The poor, dispossessed, unemployed, and
homeless are reminders that property is distributed unevenly, and
that government protection of property interests often directly favors
the interests or projects of some over those of others. In contrast, while
some individuals may be more eloquent or have more influence than
others, almost all are perceived as being able to meaningfully exercise
expressive liberties and have an interest in government protection of
expressive interests.
Judicial respect for legislative regulation of property may be
explained not merely by courts' appreciation of the need for legislators
to respond to the social problems that arise from the scarce nature and
uneven distribution of property in a market economy, but also by
legislative competence in regulating property. Specifically, in its re-
striction and reallocation of property, government can quantify and
compare liberty interests with a certain degree of apparent objectivity
unattainable in the speech context." Property values are relatively
easy (even necessary) to measure through the use of money and num-
109. Cf. Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1143 (1993)
(One descriptive premise of the First Amendment marketplace metaphor is that "enough mem-
bers of society... have meaningful opportunity to speak" and that "powerless sectors of that
population are in a meaningful position to offer ideas.").
110. A literalist could argue that individuals are dependent upon others to learn to commu-
nicate, and that none are naturally endowed with the ability to speak. While this point is
noteworthy, it does not make the attainment of communicative skills persuasively analogous to
the attainment of property.
111. Cf. C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 741, 787 n.85 (1986) ("No holdings flow solely from people's natural assets.
Holdings flow from, among other things, the exercise of natural assets within a specific cultural
and legal structure. These collective cultural and legal frameworks are crucial determinants of a
person's holdings.").
112. Cf. Gey, supra note 87, at 267-68 ("When the government regulates economic activity, it
is focusing on a concrete problem with a series of practical implications .... The interests
involved will be concrete, and usually financial in nature. Thus, economic regulations will
always be framed by the pragmatic limitations of the physical environment in which those
regulations are implemented, and the equally practical constraints of economic efficiency and
financial self-interest.").
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bers (e.g., assessing real estate value for tax purposes)."' Government
can use its objective measurement of proprietary and economic inter-
ests to make comparative assessments of the situations of different
individuals (e.g., examining incomes of different citizens) and act ac-
cordingly (e.g., establishing a minimum wage). Assessments of speech
values, on the other hand, are limited to a few general categories (e.g.,
commercial, political),"' and, beyond that, conventional wisdom holds
that government cannot reliably, and therefore should not, measure
the value of expression (based on its content, source, quantity, merit,
persuasiveness, or other standard)."5 Comparative assessments about
the content of speech by government to regulate speech are prob-
lematic, and the Court "has repeatedly held that each of us is our own
best judge of the merits of speech: '[O]ne man's vulgarity is another's
lyric,' and 'the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his
neighbor."'
6
The scarcity and uneven distribution of property, and the rela-
tive fairness and competence of legislative regulation in response to
these issues due to the quantifiable nature of property, all contribute
to judicial respect for government regulation of property. In contrast,
the perception of speech as an interest that is both easily exercised
and widely distributed, combined with the amorphous characteristics
of most speech, leads to the conclusion that regulation of speech in
113. Admittedly, real property is considered unique, and some personal possessions, such as
a wedding ring, have special value to particular persons. See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1882 n.120
(1994) (discussing common law conception of real property as unique); Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982) (discussing relation of property to
personhood). Appraisals, however, of even these types of property are routinely made to deter-
mine what property should be worth to private actors.
114. Speech is difficult to assess even when it is categorized broadly, as evidenced by Justice
Potter Stewart's 'I know it when I see it" guidance for determining "hard core obscenity."
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Note that, hypothetically, a
legislature could select some seemingly objective, quantitative standard for measuring speech
and regulate it along these lines, such as the amount of time one speaks or the size of the
audience. These measures, however, do not seem to get at the real, qualitative value of speech,
and thus we do not bother with them.
115. Cf. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (discussing commercial speech, and
stating that "the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess
the value of the information presented"); Gey, supra note 87, at 278 ("[C]ase reporters are filled
with hundreds, if not thousands, of opinions illustrating how badly governments can misjudge
the value and potential danger of antisocial speech."); Sullivan, supra note 87, at 213 ("[S]peech
may be uniquely close to consciousness. Ideas can go underground more easily and intractably
than goods and services .... Thus the enforcement of restrictions on speech might be inherently
or structurally limited in a way that restrictions on other activities are not.").
116. Sullivan, supra note 80, at 950-51 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
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response to issues of scarcity and distribution is both unnecessary and
unreliable.
2. Scarcity and Distribution in the Political Money Context
In a system of privately financed elections, the value of political
money (and some would argue the advantage of being a contributor)
reflects the fact that political money exhibits the same features of
scarcity and uneven distribution exhibited by all other property. Buck-
ley failed to adequately appreciate the importance of issues of scarcity
and distribution, and treated political money, for all intents and pur-
poses, the way speech is often conceptualized-an interest naturally
available to all in unlimited amounts that, absent government regula-
tion, can be exercised by all as much as they would like. Political
money, however, like property, is a finite commodity, drastically un-
even in its distribution. Unlike speech, political money is not some-
thing with which individuals are naturally endowed, but it is always
acquired in some way (e.g., inherited or earned) from others. While
there may be a sense of diminished need for government to reallocate
speech values because everyone is thought to be able to speak as much
as one likes, the same does not hold for the use of political money."'
An understanding of speech as naturally and freely available to
all makes it a very appealing marker of democracy, and it is not sur-
prising that a political system featuring speech as the primary me-
dium of exchange is likely to aspire toward broad participation. Po-
litical money, however, is not generally perceived as freely available to
all. If it were, it would lose most of its value to those who have it and
give it. The seemingly widespread distribution of the ability to com-
municate makes government protection of expressive liberties valu-
117. While on one hand problems caused by scarcity and uneven distribution in the property
context prompt regulation, scarcity in and of itself "is a precondition for property, which is a
precondition for markets." Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy
of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 511 n.188 (1998). Property laws protecting
ownership ensure the scarcity of property, and drive demand and provide the incentives that fuel
markets. Redistributive regulations ease the most problematic consequences of legally created
scarcity in the property context. With the exception of copyright and patent law designed to
create scarcity by converting speech into intellectual property, legally created scarcity is not the
norm in the speech context, and thus there exists less of a need for redistributive regulations.
See Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA 30, 31
(1934) ("Property rights in patents and copyrights make possible the creation of a scarcity of the
products appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained.'), cited in Cohen, supra, at 511
n.188. As opposed to the unrestricted uses that often occur in the speech context, property laws
protecting ownership and use ensure the scarcity and uneven distribution of political money. As
in the property context, courts should respect regulatory attempts to respond to the most prob-
lematic consequences of the legally created scarcity of political money.
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able to an expansive, diverse group of people, whereas government
protection of liberties associated with political money is not roughly
equally valuable to a large group of people.
While the amorphous nature of speech is likely to lead to arbi-
trary appraisals of speech, government can respond to issues of scar-
city and distribution exhibited by political money with some sem-
blance of objectivity due, in part, to the quantifiability of the interest.
Government regulation presently assesses the value of political money
using dollar amounts, as exhibited by requirements that all contri-
butions over $200118 and independent expenditures over $250119 be
reported to the FEC and by prohibitions on contributions by indi-
viduals in excess of $1000." ° Like property, political money can have
particular uses, and although given amounts have different values at
different times to various contributors, spenders, and recipients, po-
litical money nonetheless is quantifiable. One can also make com-
parative assessments of political money, and, absent this ability, the
value of political money would be drastically reduced to many who
have ample amounts of it to give. Consistent with the expectations
and desires of many donors, incumbent politicians often keep track of
those individuals who have contributed relatively large amounts of
money.
Issues of scarcity and distribution that explain judicial respect
for legislative regulations of property are glaring in the political
money context. The scarcity and uneven distribution of political
money, and the relative objectivity of measurement and valuation of
legislative regulation in this area, all support the adoption of a judicial
standard that provides for, as in the property context, a generous
amount of respect for government regulation. Courts respect govern-
ment redistribution of values in the property context not only through
taxation and legislative financing of public programs, ' but also
through restricting liberties traditionally associated with property
ownership (e.g., rent control). 2 With regard to property, redistribution
118. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (1998).
119. See id. § 434(c)(1).
120. See id. § 441a(a)(1)(A).
121. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ('The liberty of
the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the
same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered with by school
laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for
purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not.").
122. The Court has rejected the notion that control of "externalities" (i.e., interference with
others' interests, see supra Part Il.B) is the only rational reason for legislative restriction on
property, and has recognized that other reasons (such as redistribution) are also rational. See
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cannot always be achieved "by simple lump sum transfers but may
require more intrusive policies."In Similarly, courts should recognize
that government redistribution in the political money context need not
be limited simply to taxation and the public financing of campaigns,
but may also include restrictions on the use of political money.
B. Interference With Others' Interests
1. Unfair Interference in the Property Context
One person's free exercise of property may (and often does) in-
terfere with her neighbor's property interests, and there is often no
obvious or natural way to resolve conflicts and allocate decision-
making authority over property." ' Consequently, the public law-
making process enacts restrictions on the free use of property to re-
solve these conflicts, and such intervention can be interpreted as
advancing individual autonomy related to property ownership as a
whole (e.g., regulations of A's factory that limit toxic pollution enhance
B's control over and enjoyment of her property)." This phenomenon is
not limited to real property. For example, those with abundant eco-
nomic interests may have bargaining power advantages that can be
perceived as unfairly interfering with the economic interests of those
with less property.' As a result, courts respect minimum wage and
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1988) (upholding rent control ordinance despite
recognition that "it is difficult to say that the landlord 'causes' the tenant's hardship).
123. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 931, 937 (1985). But see Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
970, 970 (1985) (arguing that restraints on alienation are legitimate to control externalities but
not to "redress some asserted distributional weakness).
124. Various commentators have discussed how courts should determine "unfair" interfer-
ence with another's interests that justifies restriction on property use. Oliver Wendell Holmes
"critiqued opinions that relied on the legal maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your
property in such a way as not to injure the property of others) as question begging." DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 85, 386 n.19 (1997) (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Privilege, Malice and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 120 (1985) (originally appearing at 8
HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1894) ("[D]ecisions for or against the privilege, which really can stand only
upon [policy] grounds, often are presented as hollow deductions from empty general propositions
like sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas which teaches nothing but a benevolent yearning.. .. ');
cf. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 48-50 (1964) (noting that
nuisance control rationale tends to be rejected on the conceptual grounds that it is often impossi-
ble to tell who has caused a nuisance and who has been a victim); Joseph L. Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 161-69 (1971) (same).
125. See Baker, supra note 111, at 783.
126. See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 20 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(explaining that the externalities that justify land-use regulation can also be said to justify the
regulation of economic affairs, as owners of commodities may bargain in a way that causes
economic hardship to others); Cf Baker, supra note 111, at 780 ("Implicit in the allocation of
decision-making authority is the notion that a person's freedom of choice concerning the use of
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antitrust laws that restrict the economic liberties of some employers
and monopolistic companies in order to protect the economic interests
of employees127 and smaller competitor businesses."'5 For the past sixty
years, American constitutional law has perceived the allocation of
authority through regulation as necessary to secure the blessings of
liberty in the property context.u9
Regulation of speech, on the other hand, does not generally en-
hance the value and autonomy of expressive interests. One could per-
ceive that the core of individual autonomy is control over one's own
mind, body, and voice (which includes control over one's own ex-
pression and opinions about the expression of others), and that it is
most convenient to set the boundaries of decision-making authority at
an individual's responsibility for her own speech." ° Under this theory,
complete control over one's own speech is such a "natural" and supe-
rior allocation of decision-making authority that it almost always
outweighs benefits derived from government reallocation or restriction
of speech through regulation.13 Courts do not perceive government
regulation as enhancing the value of liberty interests or individual
autonomy in the speech context to the same degree as it does in the
property context.
Further, courts recognize that there exist situations in which
property is used in a way that unfairly interferes with the non-pro-
prietary interests of others, such as when a shopkeeper excludes pa-
trons based on race or when a company profits from selling deodorant
packaged in aerosol cans that excessively damage the ozone layer.
Consequently, courts respect legislative regulation of uses of property
resources can only extend to a point where the use directly conflicts with another person's
authority. From this perspective, laws need not restrict liberty: those that only allocate and
demarcate the boundaries of decision-making authority merely allocate liberty.').
127. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
128. See, e.g., National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 129 (1905).
129. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105 (1991).
130. See Baker, supra note 111, at 782. This concept is "deeply embedded in our political,
ethical, and economic practices" and conceives "of a person as an agent who is normally respon-
sible for her own actions and who should be permitted to make decisions for herself." Id. Such
autonomy does not include free use of another person's body or property without consent. See id.
131. Some would assert that a person's excessive use of her expressive interests never inter-
feres with another's use of her expressive interests. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 16, at 102
(describing the philosophy that "in general everyone can talk as much as they choose, however
they choose, about whatever they choose, to whomever they choose, without restricting or
devaluing anyone else's freedom to communicate"). Rather than reading this assertion as an
empirical truth, this Article interprets it as a legal observation by some that the existing alloca-
tion of speech interests in the absence of government regulation outweighs the benefits offered
by government reallocation of speech. Therefore, although expressive interests may technically
interfere with one another, these conflicts are not considered "unfair" interferences that warrant
government intervention.
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that unreasonably interfere with others' non-proprietary interests. In
contrast, while courts recognize that a private actor's speech may in-
terfere with others' non-expressive interests, this interference is not
usually viewed as unfair or illegitimate.132 To the contrary, the inter-
ference of one's speech with others' non-expressive interests is gen-
erally understood to be the essence of democracy and is encouraged.
One can use speech to advocate for change that would infringe upon
another's interests, whether it involves infringing upon a discrimi-
natory shopkeeper's profits through organizing a boycott or infringing
upon a deodorant company's profits by calling for tougher environ-
mental restrictions on aerosol cans.
2. Political Money and Unfair Interference
Like both property and speech, political money can be used to
interfere with the interests of others.133 The real issue is whether such
interference is generally a fair and legitimate component of democ-
132. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 80, at 961 (proposing that the difficulty in predicting harm from
speech might call into question the legislature's institutional competence in regulating speech).
133. Some argue that there exists no need to regulate political money because short of indi-
vidual cases of quid pro quo corruption, there is no proof that one's contribution or expenditure of
political money benefits her position or interferes with others' interests. See e.g., Smith, supra
note 37, at 1067-72 (arguing that political money does not have any significant effect on legisla-
tive voting behavior). In response, reformers have attempted to establish interference with
testimony of former elected officials, anecdotes about unpopular legislation that passed with
support by monied interests, as well as reasoning that a law restricting political money does not
infringe on a contributor's interests if no advantage is obtained by giving. See, e.g., Rosenkranz,
supra note 9, at 876-77 (citing statements of elected officials); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 9, at
1186 n.97 (describing the well-funded efforts of pharaceutical companiesto influence health care
legislation). Additionally, direct interference is not only difficult, but also unnecessary to prove,
for (1) it is unlikely that either a truth serum could be administered or politicians would volun-
tarily submit to a reliable lie detector test that would allow for the acquisition of accurate data;
and (2) a causal link may exist absent a conscious decision made by a politician (e.g., the politi-
cian may be influenced by those with whom she spends the most time, such as those at fundrais-
ers). Cf. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 311 (1981) (White, J.,
dissenting) ('erhaps... neither the city of Berkeley nor the State of California can 'prove' that
elections have been or can be unfairly won by special interest groups spending large sums of
money, but there is a widespread conviction in legislative halls, as well as among citizens, that
the danger is real. I regret that the Court continues to disregard that hazard.'); Vincent Blasi,
Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fundraising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not
Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1994) (proposing that political
money restrictions are necessary to protect the amount of time that officials have for the per-
formance of their public duties). Rather than rehashing this debate, this Article accepts the
position that political money can technically interfere with the interests of others. Just as
property can be used to interfere with proprietary and non-proprietary interests, one can use
political money to interfere with both another's use of political money (one's $100,000 contribu-
tion can dwarf another's $1000 contribution) and other interests (one's $100,000 contribution
may result in weaker environmental laws, and thus the breathing of others is impaired). The
most pressing question is whether the law should view this interference as fair or unfair.
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racy, like speech, or, as in the property context, is sometimes unfair
and illegitimate. If the use of political money is perceived as a fair and
legitimate interference with others' interests, then limits on contri-
butions and expenditures could be perceived as unfairly burdening the
liberties of those who use political money. On the other hand, in the
event political money could be perceived, like property, as sometimes
unfairly interfering with the interests of others, judicial respect for
legislative limits on a private actor's use of political money (i.e., con-
tribution and expenditure limits) might be in order.'
A hypothetical case might best illustrate the inquiry into
whether the use of political money can sometimes unfairly interfere
with the interests of others. Suppose that Charles serves as the CEO
of Sandel, a company that invests the money of lenders. Due to mis-
investment, however, Charles determines Sandel cannot cover $2.6
billion in outstanding debts. Charles, consistent with his civic-minded
nature, raises over $1.3 million for five members of the U.S. Senate
Banking Committee. Fortunately, legislation subsequently passes
with a discrete rider attached that commits the government to pay off
the debt of all companies like Sandel (legislators explain that the law
will encourage investment and stimulate the economy). The cost to
taxpayers of the bailout of all of the companies is $10 billion.3 ' As-
134. Even those who warn against restrictions on property that force a few people to bear
public burdens disproportionately (the Armstrong anti-discrimination principle) generally
subscribe to the constitutionality of restrictions on uses of property that unfairly interfere with
others' interests (the proviso principle). See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49
(1960); Frank Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional Property, in LIBERTY,
PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 127, 131 (Ellen Frankel Paul &
Howard Dickman eds., 1990) (describing the proviso principle).
It is also worthwhile to note that the Armstrong anti-discrimination principle is essentially
the inverse of John Rawls's notion of the fair value of liberties. See Rawls, supra note 103, at 326
(Lecture VIII, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority). The Armstrong principle views restric-
tions on the use of certain property as disproportionately burdening the liberties of the property
owners, while fair value of liberty views freedom from restriction on the use of certain property
as disproportionately benefiting those with the property, especially as it relates to political
liberties. Facial neutrality appears in both situations (both restrictions and liberties appear to
apply to all equally), but both restrictions and liberties have disparate impacts.
135. The highly publicized story of Charles Keating is slightly different than the hypothetical
proposed. Due in large part to alleged fraud, Keating's Lincoln Savings & Loan failed, and $2.6
billion in taxpayer funds were required to cover federally insured deposits at Lincoln. Regulators
investigated Lincoln, and Keating raised $1.3 million in political money for five U.S. Senators
and their causes while simultaneously asking that the Senators persuade regulators to discon-
tinue their audit of Lincoln. Keating's fraud was eventually discovered, and he was convicted,
and the Senators were chastised (one was officially reprimanded). See James S. Granelli,
Keating, Son Guilty of Federal Charges, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at D1. While the actual story
raises the same question of whether Keating's use of political money constitutes unfair interfer-
ence, the hypothetical may illustrate the point more clearly because it focuses on whether the
use of political money, rather than Keating's alleged fraud, is unfair.
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suming that the $1.3 million in political money caused the $2.6 billion
bailout of Sandel,"' is Charles unfairly interfering with others' inter-
ests by using his access to political money to place a financial burden
on society that would otherwise be borne by Sandel? If Charles were
restricted to using $100 in political money, would these restrictions
unfairly saddle Charles with the burdens of a public problem 3' that
should be borne by society as a whole? Is the public subsidizing Char-
les by allowing him to insert $1.3 million into the political process that
results in the $2.6 billion bailout, or is Charles subsidizing the public
when he is subjected to limitations on the use of his political money?138
In response to these inquiries, one could argue that in the po-
litical money context, "unfair" interference is properly limited by high
First Amendment scrutiny to specific quid pro quo exchanges between
a contributor and a candidate (corruption or the appearance thereof).3 '
Following such a libertarian perspective, it could be argued that the
136. As mentioned above, this Article accepts the existence of interference of political money
and focuses the analysis upon whether such interference is unfair. With regard to the influence
of political money, Keating stated: "One question ...had to do with whether my financial
support in any way influenced several political figures to take up my cause. I want to say in the
most forceful way I can: I certainly hope so." Michael Kranish, Five Senators who Aided S&L
Face Query on Gifts, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1989, at 1,12.
137. The public problem would be the need to finance elections, and the use by government
officials of the power of their public offices to facilitate the acquisition of private campaign
contributions and expenditures.
138. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 98, at 876-77 (discussing the Court's shift from perceiving
minimum wage legislation as "a subsidy to the public from an innocent employer" to the lack of
minimum wage legislation as a subsidy "from the public to the employer').
139. In Shrink, Justice Thomas interpreted Buckley as limiting the meaning of corruption to
quid pro quo, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Govt PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 923-24 (2000) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting, joined by Scalia, J.), whereas the majority interpreted corruption as "extending to the
broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors." Id. at 905.
In a case viewed as an anomaly by many commentators, Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, the Court essentially stretched the meaning of corruption to include "the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support." Austin, 494
U.S. 652, 659 (1990). Although the Court did not extensively analyze unfair interference with
the interests of others, it did hold that "[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence elections." Id. at
660. A narrow definition of corruption that focuses on a corrupt public actor's quid pro quo (or
interference with fair government decisions) could be contrasted with Austin's focus on a private
actor's corrosive use of corporate wealth (or interference with a fair electoral process). Several
commentators have participated in the debate regarding broad and narrow definitions of corrup-
tion. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Controlling Campaign Spending and the "New Corruption"
Waiting for the Court, 44 VAND. L. REV. 767 (1991); Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption
in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 127 (1997); Miriam Cytryn, Comment,
Defining the Specter of Corruption: Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 57 BROOK.
L. REV. 903 (1991); Paul S. Edwards, Defining Political Corruption The Supreme Court's Role,
10 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1 (1996); David Schultz, Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the
Evidence Required to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws, 18 REV. LITIG. 85 (1999); David
A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369
(1994).
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few instances of speech that constitute "unfair interference" and war-
rant direct restriction include the use of speech to facilitate fraud, of
which, along with misrepresentation, defamation and insider trading,
quid pro quo "corruption" is a species. 4' Otherwise, political money is
simply another legitimate tool of democratic advocacy, like other ac-
tivities protected by the First Amendment.14' Despite these assertions,
this understanding of "unfair" interference is too narrow, and a more
expansive understanding, similar to the concept of unfair interference
in the property context, is required.
While some might argue that it is most convenient to set the
boundaries of decision-making authority at an individual's almost
complete dominion over her own speech, and accept interference with
others' interests as a permissible consequence, distinct factors arise in
the political money context that should trigger a different analysis.
Control over political money extends past decision-making authority
over one's own voice and mind.14 Further, the distribution of and
privileges related to political money (the acquisition of and rules re-
garding the use of wealth) are determined in large part by the gov-
ernment and other private actors. The instability and fluctuation of
the distribution of wealth shapes the allocation of political money,
and, consequently, there is no "natural," fixed, or universal way to
resolve conflicts and allocate decision-making authority over political
140. Cf. Epstein, supra note 81, at 71-75 (explaining that under a libertarian view, speech
restrictions may be justified on the basis of preventing private force and private fraud).
141. Other critics of the regulation of political money might argue that since the Constitution
allows for taxation, redistribution, and wealth-equalization, the existing distribution of income
and wealth reflects some public sense of justice in distribution, and thus it is unjust to restrict
the use of political money. One response to these critics is that while the distribution may
generally be just, the use is not always just. While the shopkeeper may be justly entitled to her
store, she is not entitled to exclude people based on race. While a McDonald's restaurant may be
justly entitled to its receipts, it is not entitled to pay its "crew" workers less than the minimum
wage.
142. While some might justify protection for speech by asserting it is more integrally con-
nected to our understanding of personhood than is property, this argument would call for finding
an even wider gap between speech and political money. Unlike some types of property that have
special meaning (e.g., a wedding ring), political money is generally considered fungible. See
Baker, supra note 111, at 804-11. Certainly, political money may be related to thought and
speech, but that does not make political money so personal that it deserves immunity from
regulation. Indeed, a newscaster's income may be derived directly from her thought and speech
and may also be used to facilitate speech opportunities, but these direct connections do not make
the income immune from regulation or entitle a person to a job as a well-paid newscaster. Cf.
FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 508 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[E]xpenditures produce . . . speech; they are not speech itself. At least in these
circumstances, I cannot accept the identification of speech with its antecedents. Such a house-
that-Jack-built approach could equally be used to find a First Amendment right to a job or to a
minimum wage to 'produce' the money to 'produce' the speech.).
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money."' While the continued maintenance of exclusive and sovereign
control over one's voice may suggest that speech should be generously
privileged to interfere with others' interests, an identical justification
for tolerance of extensive interference with others' interests through
the use of political money is inapplicable because so many external
factors (decisions by government and private actors regarding our ac-
quisition of wealth) already dictate one's use of political money. Thus,
one cannot claim the same natural birthright to dominion over her
political money as she might to her speech.' Indeed, just as the exter-
nal, contested nature of property compels its regulation to prevent
interference and enhance the value of property to individuals (e.g.,
zoning regulations), regulation of political money often enhances,
rather than offends, individual autonomy and value in the use of
political money. For example, the political money of U.S. citizens has
greater value when non-U.S. citizens are restricted from contributing
or spending political money,'45 and the $1000 contribution has greater
value when others are restricted from contributing $1,000,000."6
Courts should recognize that, as in the property context, issues
of scarcity and distribution of political money may result in situations
in which those with abundant political money unfairly interfere with
the interests of those with less political money, and legislatures
should be able to enact laws to prevent these harms. Just as some
landlords and large companies may have unfair bargaining power over
tenants, employees, and small competitors, those with abundant po-
litical money often have unfair bargaining power over those without
political money." If American democracy is a social contract, those
143. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809-10 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
("Massachusetts could permissibly conclude that not to impose limits upon the political activities
of corporations would have placed it in a position of departing from neutrality and indirectly
assisting the propagation of corporate views because of the advantages its laws give to the
corporate acquisition of funds to finance such activities.') (citation omitted).
144. Although this argument alone might not completely account for the regulation of politi-
cal money, it is important to recognize that the rationale providing speech a broad privilege to
interfere with others' interests based on control over one's body and mind plays out differently in
the political money context.
145. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 441e (1998) (restricting contributions from non-U.S. citizens);
11 C.F.R. § 110.4(a) (1996) (same).
146. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1998) (placing dollar limitations on political con-
tributions).
147. Note that this argument is different than those calling for equality in campaign financ-
ing. Rather, the issue raised here is whether a legislature may determine that there exists a
point at which some exercise their liberty interests in such an unreasonable manner that they
unfairly interfere with others' interests. Just as antitrust law does not guarantee all companies
an equal share of a particular market or equal resources, see Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust,
Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1005, 1033-34 (1987), this
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parties without political money are in danger of being exploited and
bound by an unconscionable bargain.148 At the very least, a legislature
should be permitted to make determinations with regard to these em-
pirical questions.
As mentioned above, the use of speech to interfere with others'
interests is not looked upon as unfair but rather is accepted as the
essence of democracy. The same, however, need not be true with re-
gard to political money. Just as courts interpret and implement the
Property Clauses so as to appreciate legislatures' entrusted respon-
sibility to determine that certain uses of property pollute the environ-
ment and merit regulation, a similar interpretation and implemen-
tation is warranted that would give greater respect to legislative
findings that some uses of political money unfairly interfere with the
interests of others and warrant significant restriction.
IV. DISTRUST
The powers associated with a republican form of government
are not established for the sole purpose of being limited. If a govern-
ment cannot competently assume responsibility for particular matters,
there is no point in establishing the government. "9 Indeed, the Consti-
tution contemplates lawmaking very purposefully and "entrusts to
lawmakers a range of legislative discretion" to secure and promote
numerous public and common objectives."
Constitutionalism generally trusts representative government,
despite the existence of two primary reasons for distrust of any legis-
lative decision-majoritarian factionalism and self-serving officials.
Democracy is said to malfunction when an effective majority (either
directly or through its representatives) systematically and unfairly
uses the power of government to burden or disenfranchise a political
minority, 5' and also when government officials place their own inter-
argument is not that political money must be regulated so as to give all citizens equal political
opportunities or even equal amounts of wealth for political purposes.
148. Cf. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACT 167, 268 n.1 (E.
Barker ed., 1952) ("[A] bad government serves only to keep the poor man confined within the
limits of his poverty, and to maintain the rich in their usurpation.").
149. See Michelman, supra note 16, at 110.
150. Id. at 93.
151. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103
(1980); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("When a
majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government. .. enables it to sacrifice to its
ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.").
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ests above the conflicting interests of their constituents.52 While
courts generally harbor a healthy amount of skepticism when review-
ing any legislation, distrust is not the sole factor relied upon in deter-
mining the extent of governmental discretion. For example, when it
comes to property, courts obviously have good reason to be wary of
government favoritism and abuse. There is the fear that those with
political power, elected officials and numerical majorities, will use
their power to benefit themselves at the expense of the property inter-
ests of those without political power.'53 Despite rational distrust of
government power, however, courts appreciate the issues of scarcity,
distribution, and interference inherent in property, and respect the
authority entrusted to the public lawmaking process with regard to
the enactment of minimum wage, antitrust, zoning, environmental,
rent control, and other types of laws."
Granted, distrust is a much more salient factor with regard to
speech and motivates courts to prohibit most regulation of speech. The
protection of speech alone, however, does not reveal whether distrust
prevails to inhibit the regulation of political money, because political
money is not speech. From a conceptual standpoint, a classification of
political spending as "use, transfer, or exchange of property" is at least
as intuitively compelling-probably more so-as classification of it as
"speech" or "speaking."'55 Rather, responsible interpretation requires
the identification of some distinctive characteristic of speech that ac-
152. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 498 (1997); cf THE FEDERALIST, supra note 151, No. 10, at 80 (James Madison)
("It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests
and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at
the helm.). As evidenced by the discussion above, the issues of scarcity, distribution, and
interference with others' interests in the speech and property contexts are intertwined with
expectations about the institutional competence of the legislature to perform certain functions.
In this section, the Article compares speech, property, and political money in the context of a
discrete institutional concern---distrust of incumbent legislators and dominant political power.
Whereas issues of scarcity, distribution, and interference include a focus on competing rights,
issues of distrust emphasize the importance of a well-functioning process. Cf. Samuel Issacha-
roff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50
STAN. L. REV. 643, 644-46 (1998) (distinguishing article's process orientation from past rights-
based analyses in election law). Perhaps as reflected by the structure of this Article, analyses of
both rights and process are not necessarily inconsistent or mutually exclusive. Cf. ELY, supra
note 151, at 102 n.* ("[Fireedoms are more secure to the extent that they find foundation in the
theory that supports our entire government, rather than gaining protection because the judge
deciding the case thinks they're important.").
153. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810); THE FEDERALIST, supra note
151, No. 10, at 80 (James Madison).
154. See supra Part III.
155. Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 910 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring)
('Money is property; it is not speech.').
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counts for the special dominance of distrust in the speech context and
the corresponding protection of speech from regulation."
Speech functions as a unique component of a democracy, and
this special role is accompanied by a distinct brand of distrust sensi-
tive to the propensity of the "ins" to manipulate speech rules to ensure
that they will stay in and the "outs" will stay out. 7 The fear is that
incumbent officials and powerful political factions will "rig debate""
by stifling dissent by those who challenge their substantive political
agenda, thereby entrenching their own political power and sabotaging
democracy.5 ' In particular, the value of speech in self-government
through checking the abuses of government officials with criticism
would be diminished, as legislators would pass laws that either ex-
plicitly, or tacitly but effectively, silence criticism." All of the objec-
tives of speech, such as "attainment of truth"'61 and "participation in
decision-making, would be warped by a lawmaker's primary objec-
tive of creating speech legislation that solidifies her power base and
disadvantages her opponents.' Government decision-making, it is
156. See supra Part Hl.A.
157. See ELY, supra note 151, at 106-07; FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL LNQUIRY 86 (1982); Epstein, supra note 81, at 54; Robert C. Post, Cultural
Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV.
297, 334 (1988). The idea that distrust of the legislature is a significant principle behind the
First Amendment is not inconsistent with the strong protection courts and many commentators
reserve for political speech. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stev-
ens, J., concurring) ("Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the
constitutional protection of speech. Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected
position."); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 92-
107 (1948); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 26-27 (1971).
158. Epstein, supra note 81, at 54.
159. See ELY, supra note 151, at 106; see also Sullivan, supra note 80, at 961 ("[G]overnment
might suppress opposition simply in order to keep itself in power. Rent-seeking incumbents
unfettered by term limits might stand united on one principle: suppress information or contro-
versy that might lead voters to drive them from office."); cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, (the found-
ers] amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.") (quoting
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by Holmes, J.));
Klarman, supra note 152, at 498 (describing the phenomenon of a temporary political majority
attempting to "extend its hold on power into the future, when its members may no longer enjoy
majority status" as "the problem of cross-temporal majorities").
160. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 527, 529-38.
161. Emerson, supra note 94, at 881.
162. Id. at 882.
163. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1147
(1991) ("[T]he [First] Amendment's historical and structural core was to safeguard the rights of
popular majorities . . . against a possibly unrepresentative and self-interested Congress.");
Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 14-17 (1989)
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argued, is better when certain fundamental rights, such as the ability
to speak, are guaranteed and not subject to political. debate."M
Following this line of reasoning, many who defend judicial im-
plementation of the First Amendment that applies high scrutiny to
protect political money from regulation justify their position on dis-
trust of the public lawmaking process. Just as in the speech context,
the argument goes, government officials"s' and powerful political fac-
tions" have a tendency to want the ins to stay in and the outs to stay
out, and there is a risk that they will design political money regulation
to effectively disadvantage challengers and impair criticism of incum-
bent officials.67 Although hypothetically a legislature could debate the
merits of proposed political money legislation free of thoughts about
how the regulation impacts substantive interests, and may even enact
legislation that appears neutral, in practice restrictions would best
serve legislators' personal political objectives." Consequently, because
so much speech depends on political money, it is important that politi-
cal money be effectively immunized from those who would tinker with
it to advance their own immediate political agendas. 9
("[T]he disabling of certain classes of decisionmakers from making certain kinds of decisions,
does appear especially pertinent to thinking about freedom of speech as a rule.'); cf. Klarman,
supra note 152, at 498 (describing entrenchment by incumbents generally as the "'agency'
problem of representative government").
164. Cf. Schauer, supra note 90, at 1337 ("All of the devices of democracy are antecedent to
substantive democratic decisions, are likely to be misdecided if subject to actual and substan-
tively influenced democratic processes, and merit the protections inherent in constitutionaliza-
tion.').
165. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 644 n.9 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 692 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The incumbent politi-
cian who says he welcomes full and fair debate is no more to be believed than the entrenched
monopolist who says he welcomes full and fair competition.'); BeVier, supra note 37, at 1074-81.
166. Although, in the campaign finance context, concerns about distrust are generally di-
rected at incumbent legislators rather than powerful factions. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 679
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court today endorses the principle that too much speech is an evil
that the democratic majority can proscribe."). But see Foley, supra note 13, at 27 (arguing that
the problem of tyranny of the majority is inapplicable because the regulation of campaign finance
"does not concern the protection of a vulnerable minority from a hostile or indifferent majority").
167. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd in part and rev'd in part,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) ('The need for exacting judicial scrutiny is underscored by the plaintiffs'
contention that the legislation is a composite of measures that serve the interests of the 'ins'-
members of Congress already elected-in resisting the incursions of the 'outs.' Such a conten-
tion, if substantial, is a warning signal that dilutes the deference courts give to legislatures, at
least until the matter is painstakingly considered.).
168. See Smith, supra note 37, at 1072-75. But see Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and
Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUNI. L. REV. 1390, 1401-03 (1994).
169. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793 (1978) (observing that "[t]he fact
that a particular kind of ballot question has been singled out for special treat-
ment.., suggests ... that the legislature may have been concerned with silencing corporations
on a particular subject"). One could respond to all of the assertions above by citing reasons that
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The extension, however, of the special dominance of distrust in
the speech context to prohibit the regulation of political money results
in a paradox-the immunization of political money from meaningful
restrictions actually facilitates entrenchment. While there may be
similarities in the reasons to distrust legislative regulation of both
speech and political money, the implementation of these reasons
through the identical method of insulation from regulation produces
vastly different results. For the most part, the protection of speech
from regulation prevents lawmakers from enhancing their supporters'
speech and stifling their critics' speech through regulating and reallo-
cating speech values. Despite the impermissibility of most limitations
on political money, however, entrenchment-minded lawmakers can
still enhance their supporters' political money and temper their critics'
political money by manipulating any lawmaking that has economic
implications. 7' As described below, this orchestration is more than
simply an annoying but inconsequential loophole, but rather enables
entrenchment of both incumbent legislators and dominant political
factions and is the core of the campaign finance dilemma. 7'
A. A Cycle of Entrenchment
The same problems of entrenchment that arise from the direct
regulation of traditional speech haunt a system that protects political
money from most legislative restrictions while simultaneously allow-
ing the regulation of economic affairs. "2 There are certain winners and
courts should trust the public lawmaking process generally (e.g., political money regulation is
adopted using the same process used in public lawmaking generally, judicial motives to expand
power should prompt distrust of courts, and other issues, like apportionment, directly touch upon
self-interest but are matters for legislative determination). See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
586 (1964); Schauer, supra note 90, at 1337-38. The problem with all of these responses is that
while they may be legitimate, they are just as applicable to speech as they are to political money
(e.g., regulations on speech could be adopted through a normal political process by democratically
elected officials). Because these responses fail to distinguish between speech and political
money, they fail to explain why courts should deprive the legislature of authority over speech but
not political money.
170. Lawmaking that has economic implications goes beyond taxes or government procure-
ment, such as defense spending. Most legislative actions have economic implications to some
degree, and some government officials are able to make cost/benefit assessments as to whether
support and passage of certain legislation will enhance the fiscal status (and political money) of
their supporters.
171. Cf. Klarman, supra note 152, at 523 ("[Buckley] arguably has had a greater entrenching
effect than the campaign finance restrictions it invalidated.!).
172. Cf. Balkin, supra note 83, at 414 ("[O]ampaign finance reforms may be constitutional
not because money is not speech, but because in a very important sense it is. The government is
responsible for inequalities in access to the means of communication because it has created the
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losers in lawmaking with economic implications, and the winners have
a greater opportunity to "speak" through political money, whereas the
losers may have less of an ability to "speak" through political money.
If a politician's supporter can afford to give only $10 initially, but the
politician can make a decision that will result in a $1000 gain to the
supporter, the supporter can afford to spend much more than $10 in
support of the politician in the future. Due to the special nature of
money, this relationship can result in a self-perpetuating cycle that,
over time, snowballs by growing deeper and more entrenched."'
Theoretically, legislators could debate about substantive law-
making without regard to how their votes on particular issues will
impact their own interests. In practice, however, according to a theory
of distrust, lawmakers will serve their personal interests by enacting
laws that will benefit their financial supporters, which, under the logic
of Buckley, directly enhances the ability of the supporters to "speak."'4
All of the objectives of speech, such as "attainment of truth' '7 5 and
"participation in decision-making," 6 become disfigured by the fact
that lawmakers, in solidifying their power base, give more "speech" to
financial supporters.' An incumbent lawmaker can use government
decisions to discipline private actors who fail to contribute, do not con-
tribute enough,'78 or are affirmatively critical of the incumbent. Pro-
system of property rights that makes such inequalities possible.... Government already regu-
lates access to the political process-the first amendment simply demands that it do so fairly.').
173. Others have touched upon this cycle of entrenchment. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY
DRESSING ETC. 94 (1993) (originally appearing at Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale
and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. FOR. 327 (1991)); Foley, supra note 13, at 29; Duncan Kennedy,
Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 385 & n.55 (1973).
174. Admittedly, many understand political money is "speech" when discussed as political
contributions or expenditures, but do not consider government regulation, distribution, and
enforcement of laws regarding money as regulation of speech. See Weinberg, supra note 109, at
1143 n.189 ("[A]dherents of the marketplace metaphor .. . expect the government to enforce
property rights in communications resources, [but do] not treat this as 'rear government regula-
tion.').
175. Emerson, supra note 94, at 881.
176. Id. at 882.
177. One could draw a parallel between shaping laws in an attempt to stimulate political
contributions and conditional building permits in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483
U.S. 825 (1987). According to Justice Scalia, the government in Nollan used its regulatory power
to deny and grant building permits to bargain for easements to which it would not otherwise be
entitled absent just compensation. See id. at 836-37. In the political money context, legislators
could be seen as using their legislative powers over an array of substantive issues to bargain for
the allocation of political money that, under Buckley's equation of money with speech, they would
not otherwise be entitled to shape to their benefit. Note that incumbents have incentives not
only to use their legislative authority to maximize supporters' profits, but also to manipulate
impending legislation so as to minimize donors' losses.
178. Cf. Blasi, supra note 160, at 637-638 (i believe a proponent of the checking value should
have little difficulty upholding a ceiling on individual campaign contributions .... I would strike
the balance in favor of upholding expenditure limitations, but I regard the issue as close.'). But
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hibiting significant limitations on the use of political money empowers
government officials to advance their interests through manipulating
all lawmaking with economic implications, effectively expanding the
issue of distrust particular to speech to most substantive issues."'
This cycle results not only in the entrenchment of incumbent
legislators, but also dominant political factions that derive power from
wealth." No less than incumbent officials (and perhaps more so),
many of these dominant political factions are "choking off the channels
of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will
stay out."18' In a system protecting political money as a primary tool of
democratic exchange, there is a threat that those with a majority of
the political money might entrench their own political power by self-
interestedly spending political money on political issues that benefit
them financially," thus giving themselves greater opportunities to
shape future legislation through the use of political money." This type
cf. Lewis H. Larue, Politics and the Constitution, 86 YALE L.J. 1011 (1977) (focusing on the
importance of the First Amendment in allowing citizens to use political money to censure
officeholders). Note that a habitual donor who "cuts-off" an elected official for failure to support
the donor's legislation can be described as advancing the checking value.
179. See, e.g., John Bresnaham, Microsoft Uses Appropriations Bill to Fight Key Justice De-
partment Official, ROLL CALL, June 18, 1998, at 3 (reporting that during Justice Department
investigations into alleged antitrust violations by Microsoft, the Republican National Committee
accepted a $100,000 soft-money donation from Microsoft, and many Republicans worked to block
funding for the Justice Department's Antitrust Division).
180. Several commentators have observed that cohesive factions that are numerical minori-
ties can wield a disproportionate amount of influence. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971); KENNETH A.
SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND
INSTITUTIONS (1997); JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973); Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713, 718-22 (1985). Some have even suggested that
minority factions govern democracy, and entrench themselves through factional opportunism.
See THOMAS R. DYE & HARMON ZEIGLER, THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY: AN UNCOMMON
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 17-18 (4th ed. 1975).
181. ELY, supra note 151, at 103.
182. Such threats are comparable to concerns that the numerical majority may attempt to
entrench itself by silencing the minority in a system in which political power is broadly distrib-
uted (i.e., pure speech is the tool for democratic exchange).
183. As opposed to serving as an authoritative statement on political choice theory, this part
raises the issue of entrenchment simply to highlight a functional difference between traditional
speech and political money. Public choice theorists generally characterize the legislative process
as one in which self-serving legislators barter their votes on particular legislation in exchange for
support from rent-seeking interest groups to enhance their probability of reelection. Whether or
not one subscribes to public choice theory, the differences between pure speech and political
money have significant consequences. In a system protecting political money as "speech," those
who suffer adverse economic implications have fewer "speech" opportunities as a result of the
legislation, even if the majority of the population "consents" to legislation proposed by a faction
with political money. In a system in which political money is not protected as speech and
significant restrictions exist, legislation does not have such an extreme impact on "speech
opportunities." For comprehensive discussions on public choice theory, see generally ANTHONY
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of abuse might resemble pro-apartheid South African numerical mi-
norities entrenching their own political power by enacting laws that
had the effect of limiting the political participation of anti-apartheid
South African numerical majorities."'
This cycle is not prone to even out over time," because legisla-
tors turn for support to the same donors that they helped with eco-
nomically beneficial legislation in the previous legislative session,"
and, because of the cycle, these donors generally have more political
money to give than they had earlier.1 7 Granted, politicians need sup-
port other than financial support, different contributors often have
conflicting interests," and people obtain resources from methods other
than favorable government decisions. These observations, however, do
not make the cycle insignificant or legitimate. As long as courts treat
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); WILLIAM RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE
(1982); MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY
(1997).
184. See Foley, supra note 13, at 27 ("[L]ibertarian campaign finance (which would permit
wealthy donors to contribute as much of their wealth as they wish in their efforts to influence
electoral outcomes) might have the effect of entrenching legislative power in the hands of an
affluent minority, thereby frustrating the will of the majority.').
185. Recognition of this exchange as a self-perpetuating cycle runs counter to claims of those
who suggest that the difference between incumbent suppression of critics' speech and promotion
of supporters' business interests might be that "[t]he temptation to suppress challengers'
speech... is systemic, cutting across other alliances[,]" whereas "the latter form of corruption
will even out over time through political competition for support." Sullivan, supra note 80, at
961.
186. In a random sample of more than 1100 contributors who donated more than $200 to
congressional campaigns in 1996, 80% said they are regularly "pressured by officeholders for
contributions." John Machacek, 'Big Givers' to Political Campaigns Support Finance Reform,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, June 9, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gns File.
187. Indeed, a donor may be more likely to give if the legislator was active in passing earlier
legislation that generated greater financial gain for the donor than political money invested. In
the interest of future financial support, legislators may have an incentive to ensure donors profit
from legislation (or that donors' losses resulting from legislation are minimized).
188. One might argue that multiple wealthy private actors empowered to use significant
amounts of political money are able to "check" government officials and provide protection
against centralized government oppression. Unlike public abuse, the argument goes, the compe-
tition between various private actors inures to the benefit of less powerful, potentially abused
individuals because the private actors will not act in unison. See Epstein, supra note 81, at 55-
56; Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight From Substance, 97 Yale L.J.
1633, 1641-43 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein, Modern Republicanism]. These arguments are
unsatisfying because the situations described are too context- and fact-specific to be productively
generalized through a universal rule. See Baker, supra note 111, at 754. For example, while
private actors may compete with one another, they may consistently act adverse to the interests
of others (e.g., racism). Cf James G. Wilson, Noam Chomsky and Judicial Review, 44 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 439, 468 (1996) ("It is also a ludicrous fiction to believe that money does not tend toward
a point of view. Money likes capitalism very much. More particularly, most rich people love
more money.').
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political money as protected "speech" while granting incumbents wide
discretion to regulate the economy, the temptation of incumbents to
suppress challengers' political money and enhance their supporters'
political money through substantive regulation is systemic.
A simple hypothetical might best illustrate the entrenchment
of incumbents and private interests through the use of money. Sup-
pose Jack is a newly elected congressperson who sits on the House
Telecommunications, Trade, & Consumer Protection Subcommittee.
Jack has relatively few financial supporters, and his district is not
"safe" (Jack won his race in 1998 by only 1500 votes). At one of Jack's
fundraising receptions requiring a contribution of $1000, Jack meets
Abigail, who owns and operates Alpha, Inc., a small technology com-
pany that specializes in Type A encryption. Although Alpha is worth
only $2 million dollars, it is the largest encryption company in the
U.S. because encryption is such a new technology. Jack and Abigail
have a very substantive conversation about trade issues and technol-
ogy at the reception, and Jack appreciates both Abigail's contribution
of $1000 as well as her offer to help him raise more money in the
future.
A federal statute prohibits the export of all encryption tech-
nology due to national security concerns, but Congress is considering
amending the law so that one type of encryption technology can be
exported (there are five existing types of encryption, Types A, B, C, D,
and E). A week after the reception, Abigail tells Jack that it is very
important to Alpha that Type A encryption is exported (Ford Motor
Company has promised to give Alpha, Inc. a $15 million contract if the
technology can be exported).
Jack really doesn't care one way or another about encryption,
but since it is very important to Abigail's business, Jack wants her
support in the future, and the makers of Types B, C, D, and E have
failed to provide financial support to Jack's election committee, he
helps Abigail. Jack introduces Abigail to other members on the Tele-
communications, Trade, & Consumer Protection Subcommittee that
Jack thinks might be receptive to Abigail's claims, and Abigail ends up
giving $1000 to each of the ten other members with whom Abigail
meets. The ten other members thank Jack for introducing them to a
new funder, and tell Jack they will introduce him to some of their
friends who are funders. In voting on the measure, sixteen of the
twenty-eight subcommittee members vote for Type A to be the sole
encryption technology to be exported (despite Jack's efforts, twelve felt
as though it was against national security interests). Jack works with
the committee chair to get the bill to the floor, and after the bill pro-
ceeds through the entire legislative process, the statute is finally
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amended. Consequently, Alpha, Inc. receives a $15 million contract
from Ford Motor Company, and Abigail is ecstatic that her company
has grown (it is now worth $10 million, and she has hired four new
encryption specialists at $200,000 a year).
In the 2000 election cycle, Abigail and her four encryption spe-
cialists give Jack a total of $5000 in direct contributions. Perhaps even
more important, they follow Jack's suggestion to give ten other sub-
committee members each a total of $5000, and, in appreciation, each
of the ten subcommittee members have advised their friends to con-
tribute money to Jack. Eventually Jack realizes a net gain of $55,000
in "speech." Of the owners of the businesses that gave to Jack's com-
petitors in the 1998 election, the makers of Type B encryption tech-
nology have gone out of business because their technology was not
selected for export, and the makers of Types C, D, and E did not give
to challengers in 2000 because they were afraid Jack would vote
against them again if Jack were reelected. Jack wins his 2000 election
by 20,000 votes, and because it appears that Jack's seat is safe, the
makers of Type C encryption approach Jack with their financial sup-
port.
In the example above, the economic implications involved in
Jack's decisions and efforts as a government official enabled Jack to
give more "speech" to Abigail, his supporter, and silence his opponents
so that he could progressively entrench himself. Jack turned Abigail's
$2 million company in 1998 into a $10 million company in 2000, and,
consequently, Abigail was able to turn a $1000 contribution in 1998
into what resulted in $55,000 in contributions to Jack in 2000. Jack
was able to penalize non-supporters financially so that they either
went out of business or eventually became his supporters. This cycle of
entrenchment can continue as long as two things exist: (1) issues
about which Jack and most of the voters in his district are ambiva-
lent'89 and (2) individuals whose "speech" in support of Jack is less ex-
pensive than the gains they receive from Jack's decisions in their
189. But cf. Smith, supra note 37, at 1070 (acknowledging that political money may have a
significant impact on narrow issues arousing little public interest, but claiming that "such issues
are few'). Recognizing the finite time that even the most civic-minded Americans have to focus
on public affairs and the wide range of detailed issues that various congressional committees and
subcommittees consider, the number of legislative issues that receive nominal public attention
could reasonably be perceived as more than a 'few." Also, note that all of the voters in Jack's
district need not be ambivalent about an issue. For example, Jack may determine that even
though a decision on a particular obscure issue may anger fifty of his constituents, the decision
may attract contributions totaling $40,000 from interests outside his district and result in a net
gain of 5000 votes.
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favor.'" Certainly risk (the probability of Jack's support on a particu-
lar issue and reelection) is something these contributors must take
into account. Fortunately, however, Jack can control the extent of his
support for a particular issue, and the probability of Jack's reelection
is influenced by his refined ability to "regulate speech" in this manner.
From Abigail's perspective, an initial investment of $11,000 in
contributions to members of the House Subcommittee enabled her to
secure legislation that resulted in a $15 million contract with Ford,
and she and her four employees subsequently gave a total of $55,000
to committee members. Abigail's newfound wealth gives her an oppor-
tunity to further entrench herself by investing even more political
money in the future, perhaps through continued contributions or by
hiring a lobbyist. Her objective through further entrenchment might
involve preventing her smaller encryption competitors from securing a
legislative export exemption and the opportunity to compete with her
for a new $25 million contract with General Motors.
B. Distinction Between Protection of Speech and Political Money
Now, one may argue that the essence of democracy is, and
should be, characterized by elected officials performing favors for their
supporters, whether they be financial supporters or poverty-stricken
volunteers who walk door-to-door. A critical difference, however, be-
tween speech and political money is that "it is possible to protect free-
dom of speech without at all confronting what is critical about eco-
nomic affairs in... [society] ....9 In a system without significant limits
on political money, most lawmaking distributes certain economic
benefits that can be easily translated into political power. ' The con-
tinuous cycle of giving political money and reaping economically bene-
ficial regulation, and subsequently using larger amounts of political
money and reaping more economically beneficial regulation, can en-
190. See Edward A. Kangas, Soft Money and Hard Bargains, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1999, at
A27 (reporting comment regarding political money by the chairman of the global board of
directors of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu that "[y]ou must weigh whether you meet your responsi-
bility to your shareholders better by investing the money in the company or by sending it to
Washington").
191. Epstein, supra note 81, at 46.
192. Cf. Strauss, supra note 139, at 1384. Like voting rights:
property rights too are a creation of the state. Property rights are created to serve cer-
tain purposes, and they are limited (by tax laws and the law of nuisance, for example) in
order to promote certain objectives. There is no necessary reason that they cannot be
limited further to promote political equality. It would not be "wholly foreign," or even
mildly questionable, to argue for a progressive income tax on the ground that disparities




trench political power.'93 By contrast, in a system that protects pure
speech but has significant limits on political money, as the govern-
ment does not routinely allocate and restrict pure speech interests,
those who economically benefit from government regulation have not
acquired a tool that they can use to further entrench their political
power."' One is generally naturally endowed with pure speech (it is
not an interest that the government regulates or redistributes), and
thus the ability of a legislator's allies to exercise this activity is gener-
ally not amplified by the legislator's official government decisions. 9'
Ironically, the public lawmaking process only enters the business of
allocating and distributing "speech" when political money is treated as
such.
Modifying the hypothetical presented above, if significant po-
litical money limitations made a financial contribution or expenditure
by an individual less important, and Abigail simply volunteered to
work on Jack's campaign, Jack may have attempted to persuade the
members of the subcommittee in the first legislative session to give an
export exemption to Type A technology. Jack may have been success-
ful, and Alpha may have secured the $15 million Ford contract. Sub-
sequently, however, Abigail's ability to support Jack would not be
magnified five times due to the legislative decision made earlier on her
behalf. The government decision would not give Abigail any advantage
as to future legislation in relation to her competitors, the owners of
193. This situation is not unlike giving government the power to distribute property, and
then giving to property holders an escalating advantage in influencing government decision-
making that increases in conjunction with the amount of property they acquire.
194. Some commentators claim that no difference exists between political money and other
tools of political power, such as "speaking and writing ability, good looks, personality, time and
energy... organizational skills," celebrity, and "access to or control of the popular press." Smith,
supra note 37, at 1077; see also ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 657 ("[Tlhere is no clear
point of demarcation that separates disparities in wealth from other differential distribution of
resources that bear on the political process."). Government's ability, however, to directly impact
the distribution of economic resources distinguishes political money from not only speech, but
also the rest of these tools.
195. One could argue that the government allocates speaking opportunities in ways other
than trading legislation for political money support. The celebrity and platform accorded an
incumbent official simply by virtue of holding office breed various intangible speech benefits, and
there are also specific tangible benefits (e.g., the franking privilege). The existence of these
speaking opportunities, however, does not warrant the use of the First Amendment to protect the
use of wealth allocated as a result of government decisions to influence future government
allocations. Others might argue that legislators occasionally use their power to appoint support-
ers to high profile positions that effectively give the supporters "more speech." The opportuni-
ties, however, are much more limited and less systematic than the distribution of economic
benefits that can be used as political money, and often the enhancements (e.g., an appointment
to the federal bench or an ambassadorship) are not used to directly benefit an incumbent's
reelection in the same way political money is used.
2000] 1281
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Types C, D, and E (as well as the former maker of Type B technology,
who is currently destitute). -
C. Unrestricted Political Money Defeats First Amendment Objectives
Judicial implementation of the First Amendment that protects
speech from regulation is intended to prevent incumbent political
power from entrenching itself by unfairly using the power of govern-
ment to sabotage the political opportunities of opponents and critics.'
The use by courts of high First Amendment scrutiny to prevent sig-
nificant restrictions on the use of political money does not advance
these goals, even in light of the arguments advanced by those against
the regulation of political money.
For example, one could argue that if legislators and interest
groups are too explicit and perverse in their economic regulation allo-
cating "speech" to their supporters, the democratic majority without
political money could step in and remove them from office."' Disclo-
sure laws, the argument goes, are designed to facilitate the detection
of this problem, and democracy can respond to it.'98 The weaknesses in
this argument resemble shortcomings in arguments made in defense
of the regulation of traditional speech (which, just like other laws, are
disclosed to the public). First, what if the legislators are savvy enough
to modulate their regulation of "speech" so that they entrench their
power, but do not trigger majority outrage? Second, what if, by regu-
lating and redistributing "speech," the legislature confused and dis-
abled the democratic majority, manipulating the accepted tool of po-
litical mobilization to such an extent that the democratic majority was
unable to effectively organize to challenge the incumbent lawmakers?
Others assert that the manipulation of lawmaking to enhance
incumbent access to political money is caused not by the unregulated
196. See ELY, supra note 151, at 106-07; cf. id. at 13 (stating that interpretivists must "iden-
tify the sorts of evils against which the provision was directed and... move against their con-
temporary counterparts').
197. Cf. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 151, No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) ('If a faction con-
sists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the
majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote.").
198. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 643 (1996) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986); LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE
SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 330-35 (1996); Ralph K.




nature of political money, but rather the compromised nature of other
property. Specifically, Professor Richard Epstein states:
The only way to stop the power of special interest legislation is to limit the stakes of
the political game, and this result in turn can be achieved only if the courts impose
strict limitations on governmental taxation and regulation of private property and con-
tract, limitations that are far more stringent than the highly deferential "rational ba-
sis" test now in vogue. 19
According to Professor Epstein, reform comes through government
limiting itself to the protection of strong individual property rights
and minimal reallocation of property interests through restrictions
and redistributive policies, and results in a reduction of interest group
incentives to petition government for partisan advantage.'
Setting aside the suggestion that the ultimate goal of Professor
Epstein's argument is to undermine the regulation of property rather
than address the problem at hand,"' and ignoring the practical costs of
reestablishing the absolute nature of property as opposed to placing
reasonable limits on political money to solve this problem, there are
other concerns with his position. First of all, there are real reasons of
scarcity, distribution, and interference with others' interests that
cause courts to defer to legislative restrictions on property. 2 Re-
sponding to the problem of rent-seeking by disregarding issues of scar-
city, distribution, and interference discards both the baby and the
bath water. Such a solution is not unlike prohibiting criminal prosecu-
tions of mafia figures in order to resolve the problem of bribery of
judges by mafia defendants. Second, even in a system of relatively
unregulated property rights, the distribution of economic power is not
pre-political but results from government rules and regulations.' As
shown by the hypothetical above, almost every law (not just taxes and
redistributive subsidies) influences the allocation of economic inter-
ests, whether it involves exports, national security issues, opening a
government park, regulating pharmaceuticals, or establishing class
action procedures. Consequently, it seems likely that interested par-
ties will always be ready to use political money if allowed to do so.
Further, the decision to have fewer laws allocating economic interests
only slows the use of political money when the few laws adversely and
exclusively affect those who do not have expendable political money.
For example, if there were few laws, and they all benefited those
199. Epstein, Modern Republicanism, supra note 188, at 1645.
200. See Epstein, supra note 81, at 56; Epstein, Modern Republicanism, supra note 188, at
1645.
201. See Michelman, supra note 134, at 139.
202. See supra Part III.
203. See Singer, supra note 97, at 487-91.
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without property to the detriment of those with property, it is probable
that those with resources would use political money in an attempt to
enact new laws to protect their property. Finally, from a purely theo-
retical perspective, Professor Epstein offers no reason to set the line of
constitutionality at protection of existing distribution. Other positions
could be just as easily constitutionalized and immunized from political
debate (and political spending), such as a constitutionally guaranteed
tax of forty-five percent and a guaranteed annual standard of living
allowance for all of $25,000.
As shown by the application of the speech test to political
money, distrust is not "a universal solvent indifferent to substance,"'
but calls for different judicial treatment based upon the nature of a
particular liberty interest. Judicial protection of speech is intended to
prevent incumbent political power from entrenching itself by unfairly
using government devices to sabotage the political opportunities of
opponents and critics. The use of high First Amendment scrutiny by
courts to prevent significant restrictions on the use of political money
does not advance these goals due to the differences between political
money and speech. The only way to protect the rationality of the two-
tier regime that preserves heightened protection for speech over prop-
erty is to allow meaningful restrictions on political money. Otherwise,
issues of distrust pervade substantive lawmaking generally. The very
principle that motivates constitutional protection of speech from
regulation-preventing the ins from manipulating laws to stay in-
must be interpreted to entrust the public lawmaking process with
enacting restrictions on political money to prevent this danger from
spreading to all substantive lawmaking with economic implications.
V. OBSERVATIONS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Political money possesses a number of the characteristics that
appear to explain judicial appreciation of the legislature's role in the
field of property regulation. Moreover, the combination of relatively
relaxed judicial review of property regulations with stringent review of
political money regulations appears not to serve but rather to disserve
First Amendment objectives related to preventing unfair incumbent
entrenchment. Application of high First Amendment scrutiny to po-
litical money thus not only overlooks important characteristics that
distinguish political money from speech and connect it to property, but
204. Michelman, supra note 16, at 111 (footnote omitted).
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is also a self-defeating strategy with regard to the purposes that ani-
mate First Amendment jurisprudence.
While it would be tempting, at this point, to embrace the ar-
guments of Justice Stevens in his Shrink concurrence by surmising
that courts should use the Property Clauses exclusively in considering
regulations of political money, and proposing that the judiciary adopt
a standard of review based solely upon the logic that "money is prop-
erty," such a conclusion would be premature. Simply because political
money differs from speech does not mean that courts should adopt
identical treatment for both the regulation of political money and
other types of property regulation. Political money differs from most
property, and resembles speech, in some constitutionally relevant
ways.
For example, even though the immunization of political money
from regulation does not prevent entrenchment in the same way pro-
tection of speech does, political money shares with speech the special
distrust of the "ins" manipulating regulation to keep themselves in
and the "outs" out. Indeed, as this problem is presented both in the
context of substantive lawmaking and direct regulation of political
money, it may be even more vexing with regard to political money
than speech. In contrast, judicial limitations on the regulation of prop-
erty generally arise from distrust that government officials and ma-
jority factions might unfairly manipulate property laws to dis-
proportionately saddle an individual or group with public burdens.
Whereas courts are concerned about entrenchment-minded incumbent
political power when considering regulations of both political money
and speech, they focus on distributive fairness when evaluating re-
strictions on property. 5 Even a method of judicial review of political
money regulation differing from review of speech regulation, therefore,
should take into account and effectively respond to concerns of incum-
bent entrenchment.
There are other concerns with treating political money regula-
tions exactly like property regulations. In the property context, courts
often respond to a finding of distributional insensitivity by an
overzealous legislature through the use of a takings device-if gov-
ernment regulation goes too far it results in a taking and just compen-
sation is required.' Property's just compensation requirement does
205. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Note, however, the regulation
of political money not only poses issues of entrenchment, but also involves questions regarding
allocation of burdens. See supra Part Im.B.2.
206. See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49; ELY, supra note 151, at 97; Epstein, supra note 81, at 51-
53. Note, however, that Justice Scalia has opined that because of the state's high degree of
control over commercial activities, there may not be any regulatory taking of personal property
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not appear to be an extremely promising device to check legislative
excesses in either the political money or speech context. While courts
might be able to define a manageable standard to determine when an
otherwise publicly desirable regulatory scheme constitutes an exces-
sive burden on either one's speech or one's political money,' it is un-
clear how those wronged would be adequately compensated.
A. The Problem: An Intersection of Competing Liberties
The unique functional characteristics of political money raise
concerns about identical judicial treatment of regulations of political
money and regulations of property generally. At the same time, how-
ever, squeezing political money into the confines of the First Amend-
ment also results in a fairly uncomfortable fit. Clearly, the fact that
courts would fail to consider all of the concerns that accompany politi-
cal money in using a pure property standard does not detract from the
failure of courts to consider the property-like characteristics of politi-
cal money when applying high First Amendment scrutiny.
In exposing the property characteristics of political money, and
distinguishing political money from speech, the issue of whether
courts should look to property or speech doctrines in determining the
proper treatment of political money should appear at least debatable.
Indeed, a conclusion that political money is identical to other types of
property and should be regulated as such would defeat the objectives
of this Article. A certain degree of ambiguity is necessary here because
only in acknowledging both the property and speech characteristics of
political money can a court appropriately apply a constitution that
addresses both.
Buckley's failure stems from its formalistic inability to appreci-
ate and respond to the competing constitutional doctrines and differ-
ent judicial treatment of property and speech. Buckley categorized
political money as an interest warranting judicial treatment generally
employed to protect speech interests without considering issues that
(in contrast to real property). See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-
28 (1992) (stating that "in the case of personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally
high degree of control over commercial dealings... [a] new regulation might even [constitution-
ally] render . . .property economically worthless (at least if the property's only economically
productive use is sale or manufacture for sale)').
207. For example, one could assert that a political money limitation that "entirely forecloses
a channel of communication" constitutes an excessive burden on the use of one's political money.
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 910 & n.* (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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motivate different judicial treatment of property.' This type of for-
malism presents two problems that both transcend campaign finance
law and are applicable to First Amendment interpretation generally,
although the first issue is more commonly discussed than the second.
The first problem with Buckley's formalism is that it is in-
exact-it neglects key elements. Even though political money was
clearly not speech (nor did the Court claim it to be), the Court in Buck-
ley, in its formalist drive for clear categorization, applied to political
money regulation the test generally reserved to determine the proper
judicial treatment of regulation of speech.' As mentioned above, the
Court stated that the presence of money did not dilute a" 'pure form of
expression! ""' or operate "to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by
the First Amendment."211 Despite the fact that multiple constitutional
values were implicated, and that the contested regulation arguably
advanced or detracted from these constitutional values in different
ways, Buckley's formalism keeps it simple: political money should be
judicially protected like speech. Under Buckley's logic, the question
essentially involves determining which prefabricated judicial category
is more compellingly applicable to regulations of political money. The
mutually exclusive nature of formalism artificially forces courts to
choose sides and, by doing so, miss important issues of scarcity, distri-
bution, and interference. 2 By playing the First Amendment card,
Buckley "suppress[es] the complexities, the intersections and conflicts,
of historic American constitutional values."213 This critique applies
with equal force to the Stevens concurrence categorizing political
208. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("General
propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition
more subtle than any articulate major premise.'); HORWITZ, supra note 97, at 10-19 (describing
the tendency of nineteenth-century legal scholars to structure the law through abstract catego-
ries); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605-06 (1908) (proposing
that classical reasoning that attempts to order all particular facts into clearly defined, fixed,
universal legal categories may be arbitrary and unworthy of public confidence).
209. Some, however, claiming that Buckley did not apply a strict scrutiny standard to contri-
bution limits, might assert thai the case did not formally categorize contributions as warranting
protection by a traditional First Amendment standard. See supra Part I.A. Even accepting this
perspective, the Court's analysis was still completely within the framework of the First Amend-
ment and failed to consider constitutional property doctrines allowing for less rigorous scrutiny.
210. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (per curiam) (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 564 (1965)).
211. Id. at 16.
212. Cf. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1252 (1991) (explaining how "the
failure of antiracist and feminist discourses to address the intersection[] of race and gender"
contributes to the subordination of women of color).
213. Michelman, supra note 134, at 155 (describing the effects of Cartesian formalism gener-
ally, rather than Buckley in particular).
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money as exclusively warranting judicial treatment generally reserved
for property.
The second problem with Buckley's formalism is a little differ-
ent. Even though it was evident that political money involved property
issues, the Buckley opinion did not even consider the application of
judicial tests associated with traditional constitutional property doc-
trines.214 The point is not that Buckley was an anomaly, blazing a trail
in American law that had never been explored. Rather, there are cer-
tain issues that both Buckley and the formalist tradition generally
seem to take for granted, and fail to adequately explain. Why, when
constitutional categories and doctrines intersect in contexts like politi-
cal money, should courts ritualistically apply the more exacting scru-
tiny required by the First Amendment? Why should American law
choose to wholly embrace one scheme to the exclusion of the other?
Does a court oversimplify the matter when it ignores the intersection
and selects as controlling the one form of judicial treatment that most
stringently scrutinizes legislative regulation?15
A number of defenses of the status quo can be imagined, and
all are less than convincing. One might claim that if courts did not
always err in one direction or another, cases involving intersecting
liberties would be left up to the individual discretion of the judge,
which would result in an unprincipled patchwork of doctrine. This
argument, however, fails to explain why a rule requiring consistent
214. Although the Supreme Court did not focus on the use of political money as an economic
liberty, the Court of Appeals in Buckley considered and quickly discarded the suggestion that
regulation of political money deserved the judicial protection generally afforded to economic
regulation. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975), afrd in part and rev'd in part,
424 U.S. 1 (1976). As the appeals court stated:
Defendants go too far in saying that this is ordinary legislation, entitled to the conven-
tional presumption of validity that would be applicable, say, to economic regulation. In
view of the interests involved, both the compelling government interest needed to sustain
such provisions, and the associational freedoms that are impinged, strict judicial scrutiny
of the challenged provisions is appropriate.
Id.
215. Justice Stevens is not immune from this mutually exclusive formalism. After advancing
a daring argument that political money is property and should be protected by the Property
Clause rather than the First Amendment, he retreats to the exclusive application of First
Amendment doctrine when a regulation of intersecting property and speech interests "entirely
forecloses a channel of communication, such as the use of paid petition circulators." Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 910 n.* (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
may have added this note in an attempt to distinguish his Shrink concurrence from an earlier
majority opinion he authored invalidating prohibitions on paid petition circulators (Meyer v.
Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988)), and cited by Justice Thomas in criticizing the Stevens concur-
rence in Shrink. Id. at 919 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The note shows, however, that Justice
Stevens assumes the supremacy of the First Amendment doctrine over the constitutional prop-
erty doctrine when both doctrines are applicable, and that he does not focus on the particular
characteristics of property that explain judicial deference to legislative decision-making.
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error toward the highest form of protection provides more restraint on
judicial power than a rule consistently erring toward the lowest pro-
tection. A second defender might claim that if we are going to err, we
should consistently err on the side that gives the most protection to
individual liberties. As articulated above, however, erring on the side
of individual liberties is, in and of itself unclear, especially in cases
like property and political money that, by their very nature, involve
conflicts of liberty claims."6 Finally, another conservator of the status
quo might argue that if a regulation is sufficiently important, it will
satisfy high First Amendment scrutiny, and therefore a legislature
can prevent the most obnoxious-uses of liberty interests even if judges
generally use improper standards in protecting the liberty interests. If
there are reasons that courts do not generally protect property with
high First Amendment scrutiny, however, and those reasons are pres-
ent in a given situation, should they be completely ignored?17
The question of whether other contexts exist in which other
constitutional provisions starkly intersect and raise questions of ap-
propriate judicial treatment, so aptly exhibited by Buckley, deserves
further discussion in another forum, and may lead to a standardized
approach to these conflicts generally. 8 The significance, however, of
216. See supra Part Im.B; cf. Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J. concurring):
[Tihis is a case where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal
equation. For that reason there is no place for a strong presumption against constitu-
tionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the words 'strict scrutiny.' Nor can we
expect that mechanical application of the tests associated with 'strict scrutiny-the tests
of 'compelling interests' and 'least restrictive means'--will properly resolve the difficult
constitutional problem that campaign finance statutes pose.
217. A related question recognizes that courts consciously abandoned strict protection of
property rights from legislative pronouncements during the first half of the twentieth century,
and asks why courts resurrect stringent protection once property moves into the political realm.
See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
260 (1990) ("Why has the judiciary virtually abandoned property in some forms, but not others?
Why give up th6 overt formal limits with respect to economic regulation and social assistance,
and enforce the power and privilege of property against the egalitarian measures of campaign
finance laws?'); Frank I. Michelman, Political Truth and the Rule of Law, 8 TEL AVIV U. STUDIES
IN L. 281, 288 (1988) ("For is it not, after all, a fair question why realism and relativism should
have been such potent destroyers of juristic absolutism shielding the market manifestations of
property rights against legislative control, but so impotent as the Buckley manifesto implies
when it comes to their manifestations in the political sphere?'); Frank I. Michelman, Possession
vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1344-45 (1987).
218. This Article does not propose that courts should never defer to the highest standard of
protection when liberty interests intersect. Borrowing an example from the Equal Protection
area, it makes sense that a law explicitly calling for "the forfeiture of property owned by any
African American convicted of selling crack cocaine" should be subject to strict scrutiny. Even
though property issues are involved, it is obvious that they are not the animating principles
behind this law. On the other hand, however, it is not as clear that a law requiring "the forfei-
ture of property owned by anyone convicted of selling crack cocaine" should be subject to strict
scrutiny, even though African Americans are disproportionately burdened by the law. In com-
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political money with regard to the creation of substantive law gen-
erally, as well as the failure of formalism to consider constitutionally
relevant issues, prompt a search for alternative methods of constitu-
tional interpretation with regard to political money.
B. Navigating the Intersection
Clearly, justifiable reasons exist for generally entrusting more
of the boundary drawing between individual liberties and other socie-
tal interests to legislatures in some areas (such as property) but gen-
erally entrusting more of the work to courts in other areas (such as
speech). Recognizing that the use of political money implicates both
areas, a method for determining judicial treatment for matters in the
intersection is needed that will consider competing constitutional
concerns.
Before describing a judicial test to apply to the political money
context, it may be worthwhile to briefly discuss other intersections of
property doctrine and speech doctrine where courts have devised dif-
ferent tests and approaches for dealing with different intersections.
On one hand, traditional speech doctrine governs many intersections
of property and speech, such as regulations of flag burning and the
content of newspapers.219 On the other hand, traditional First Amend-
ment doctrine has also tolerated several departures from formal pro-
hibitions on the regulation of speech in other intersections. For exam-
ple, both property and speech issues arise with regard to mall leaflet-
ing, Internet regulation, intellectual property, billboards, lawnsigns,
nude dancing, adult movie theaters, consumer protection, commercial
speech, antitrust (e.g., price-fixing), securities regulation (e.g., insider
trading), labor, contract, and television airwaves. These different
intersections of property and speech implicate a number of tests that
paring the analogy to political money, this Article is in agreement with Judge Skelly Wright's
argument that Congress wanted a "straightforward regulation of the excessive use of money as a
blight on the political process," and "was unconcerned with the type or quantity of speech that
might result" under the new limits. Wright, supra note 46, at 1008 & n.36 (emphasis removed).
But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) ('The interests served by the Act include re-
stricting the voices of people and interest groups who have money to spend.').
219. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (striking down federal prohi-
bition of flag burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (striking down Texas law
prohibiting flag burning); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974)
(striking down statute requiring newspapers to provide political candidates "rght of reply'); see
also Mark Cordes, Property and the First Amendment, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 52-63 (1997)
(observing that private property interests enhance expression).
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depart from formal prohibitions on regulation of speech.' The differ-
ent tests show that courts have been somewhat situation-specific in
applying First Amendment doctrine in the property context, and de-
flates the claims of those critics who suggest that a "one-size fits all"
First Amendment doctrine must be applied to every instance impli-
cating expression, including the use of political money.'
Just as a formal First Amendment rule does not address the
particular characteristics of political money, the creation of a general
single rule or guiding principle that connects all of the intersections of
property and speech listed above to the regulation of political money is
likely to be imprecise.' Instead, the various intersections raise a few
important issues that are relevant to the political money context.
220. Cf. Epstein, supra note 81, at 57 ("[The Court] has to police the undeniable friction that
takes place at the property/speech frontier. Otherwise, the Court is in danger of indirectly
undoing all forms of property regulation in the name of free speech."); Michelman, supra note 16,
at 110 ("Yet, whatever faults one may find with the Court's handling of the direct/incidental
distinction, it is hard to withstand the inevitability of the distinction itself. The distinction is
plainly designed to preserve lawmaker discretion against the otherwise boundless, trumping
power of free expression rights.").
221. See Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 919 n.4 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.)
(citing cases supporting a formal application of the First Amendment in cases involving property
and speech to criticize the claim by Justice Stevens that money is property rather than speech).
Dean Kathleen Sullivan asserts that "[a]ny blanket reversal of Buckley's premise that restric-
tions on political money implicate the First Amendment... would bring down a great deal of law
in its wake." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311,
317. The creation of a judicial test that acknowledges that restrictions on political money
implicate the First Amendment as well as other constitutional doctrines application does not
constitute a "blanket" reversal of Buckley. Indeed, one could argue that an expansion of Buck-
ley's focus on First Amendment formalism to the exclusion of other interests would bring down a
great deal of law in its wake, including but not limited to regulations currently permissible
under the direct/incidental test. For example, the Court found that "a state may not force a
publisher to escrow the proceeds of confessional crime books for possible payout in restitution to
victims, reasoning that such a financial disincentive to publication is no less suspect than a ban."
Id. at 317 (footnotes omitted) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117, 121 (1991)). A formal interpretation of the First Amendment
viciously guarding the supremacy of the expressive liberties in relation to other interests,
however, would exempt the publishing company from antitrust and compulsory bargaining labor
laws because they could siphon off money that might be spent on publishing more crime books.
Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 263 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
taxation and antitrust laws as applied to newspapers are not invalid simply because they
"prevent the accumulation of large sums that would otherwise be available for communicative
activities").
222. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1689-90 (1976) (claiming that "the wider the scope of the rule, the more serious the
imprecision becomes). Imprecision arises from both a general, single rule equating political
money with other regulated intersections of property and speech (e.g., billboards, commercial
speech) as well as an application to political money of a general rule prohibiting regulation of
intersections of property and speech (e.g., flag burning and newspapers). Allowing for more
regulation of political money does not necessitate a doctrinal change that allows for the regula-
tion of flag burning, newspapers, and other property/speech intersections, or the regulation of
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First, there are several situations in which state interference
with attributes of property ownership directly affect speech rights. For
example, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,' the Court held
that a state grant to individuals of the freedom to enter a privately
owned shopping mall and gather petitions, effectively burdening a
property owner's right to exclude," ' did not violate the property
owner's First and Fifth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitu-
tion.'s
Granted, there are instances in which the Court has recognized
that property owners have the right to place their property at the
service of some ideologies and not others.' Pruneyard, however,
shows that there are some situations in which a state may constrain
property rights in a way that affects the owner's property and speech
interests." Given judicial respect for legislative restrictions on a prop-
erty owner's right to exclude in the shopping mall context, it is not
implausible to propose that courts give greater respect to legislative
restrictions on the right to transfer property in the campaign finance
property holdings used in pursuit of other constitutionally protected interests (e.g., abortion,
legal defense, religion). Political money is different for a number of reasons, including but not
limited to the entrenching impact of the existing uneven distribution of property on future
allocations of property (through lawmaking).
223. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
224. Id. at 82-83.
225. Id. at 84, 88 (1980). In Pruneyard, the Court held that the California State Constitu.
tion's grant to individuals of the freedom to gather petitions in a privately owned shopping mall
did not violate the property owner's First and Fifth Amendment rights. Id. The California
Constitution provided that "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain
or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2. Note that in the absence of a
specific state action altering the rights of property owners, the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not prevent a property owner from excluding demonstrators. See Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972).
226. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (holding that a State
may not require that a person "contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (invalidating New Hampshire's compelled display
of the state's "Live Free or Die" motto on automobile license plates).
227. Public accommodations laws also involve legislative infringement upon the First
Amendment rights of property owners. See New York State Club Ass'n. v. City of New York, 487
U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (upholding local public accommodations laws against First Amendment associa-
tional rights challenge). Similarly, the time, place, and manner doctrine may allow the legisla-
ture the discretion to prevent a property owner from freely using his or her property to advance
his or her expressive interests. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-68 (1991)
(plurality opinion) (upholding the regulation of nude dancing); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515-17 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding billboard regulation); Young v
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976) (upholding restrictions on adult movie
theatres locations).
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context, especially recognizing that many consider the right to exclude
as more central to property than the right to transfer. 8
Second, courts have recognized that "function" is often an im-
portant question in navigating many of the intersections of property
and speech. For example, in Marsh v. Alabama, the Court determined
that a company-owned town functioned no differently than a munici-
pally incorporated town.' Consequently, on First Amendment
grounds the Court reversed a state conviction of criminal trespass for
distributing religious literature on a company town sidewalk. Simi-
larly, the law recognizes that certain types of speech possess the func-
tional characteristics of property. As an exception to First Amendment
formalism, copyright law recognizes that some speech functions like
property, and provides intellectual property real protection from in-
fringement by others (like property) which eventually expires to pro-
mote a free exchange in ideas (like speech).' In the campaign finance
context, courts should recognize and respond to the observation that
political money shares functional characteristics with both property
and speech.
228. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 734-35
(1998) (discussing the philosophy espoused by a number of scholars, including William Black-
stone, Jeremy Bentham, and Felix Cohen, that "the right to exclude is the irreducible core
attribute of property).
229. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503 (1946) ("[Ihe town and its shopping district are
accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them
from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property belongs to
a private corporation.'); see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the private Jaybird Democratic Association functioned as a state actor and thus the
exclusion of blacks from the organization's pre-primary elections violated the Fifteenth Amend-
ment); New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d
757, 780 (N.J. 1994) (considering expressive rights of mall patrons, and holding that "regional
shopping centers are, in all significant respects, the functional equivalent of a downtown busi-
ness district").
230. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984). As Justice Brandeis has stated:
The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths as-
certained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others, free
as the air to common use. Upon these incorporeal productions the attribute of property is
continued after such communication only in certain classes of cases where public policy
has seemed to demand it. These exceptions are confined to productions which, in some
degree, involve creation, invention, or discovery.
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
Courts have also analyzed traditional functional understandings of speech and property in
resolving conflicts in cyberspace. See, e.g., CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.
Supp. 1015, 1027-28 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (issuing a preliminary injunction enjoining Cyber Promo-
tions from sending unsolicited advertisements to e-mail addresses maintained by CompuServe,
reasoning that advertisements constitute a trespass to chattels on the property of CompuServe
unprotected by the First Amendment).
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Third, deference to government restraints on intersections of
property and speech may reflect an attempt, to some degree, to re-
spond to the increasing privatization of democracy. For example, in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court upheld the "fairness
doctrine," which required that broadcasters address public issues and
allow equal time for opposing viewpoints.231 While they may be consid-
ered anomalies, both Pruneyard and Red Lion involve the recognition
that states and Congress may have a role in limiting the exercise of
liberties by certain property owners in order to secure the relative
expressive liberties of others. 2 Courts should allow legislatures to
respond to the increasing privatization of democracy by allowing
meaningful restrictions on the use of political money.
While the three observations above do not provide any deter-
minative conclusions, they do provide general insights related to the
numerous exceptions courts have made regarding other intersections
of property and speech that may be relevant in reconsidering judicial
treatment of regulations of political money.
In turning toward devising a better judicial approach in the
political money context in particular, there are a few other issues to
consider. First of all, the problem is not simply a matter of levels and
degrees of judicial "scrutiny." In the proliferation of fairly generic tests
demanding government interests that are legitimate, important and
compelling, courts occasionally ignore the specific reasons that the
doctrine allows, or protects a liberty interest from, legislative inter-
vention. Application of a rational basis or intermediate standard of
scrutiny to political money does not, in and of itself, take into account
the relevant issues surrounding entrenchment, scarcity, distribution,
and interference with others' interests in the political money context.
A proper negotiation of the intersection with regard to political money
calls not for an intermediate standard of review that falls "in between"
existing standards of review for property and speech, but rather a sui
generis standard for a sui generis case. A bottle-nosed dolphin, for
example, shares some distinct traits with fish and others with chim-
panzees. As opposed to housing the marine mammal in a swampy
231. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90, 400-01 (1969). But see Miami
Herald Pubrg Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974) (striking down a "right of reply"
statute that required a privately-owned newspaper to provide space to political candidates to
reply to criticism previously published in the newspaper).
232. Cf. New Jersey Coalition Against War, 650 A.2d at 780 (arguing that private property
owners, such as shopping mall owners "who have so transformed the life of society for their profit
(and in the process, so diminished its free speech) must be held to have relinquished a part of
their right of free speech. They have relinquished that part which they would now use to defeat
the real and substantial need of society for free speech at their centers!).
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tank of mud, a good zookeeper is mindful of the dolphin's likeness to
fish with regard to mobility, but also recognizes the dolphin's simi-
larities to chimpanzees with regard to breathing and giving birth. Po-
litical money does not simply fall "in between" property and speech,
but has important functional characteristics of each," and courts
should not be only "half' as concerned about these characteristics
when they are manifested in the political money context.
Second, courts should not dismiss, but rather should consult,
existing doctrines in devising a new test for political money. Recog-
nizing that the motivating factor for displacing the status quo involves
an effort at improved negotiation of two competing judicial doctrines,
courts should draw upon both doctrines in contemplating the appro-
priate treatment for political money. Further, these well-established
doctrinal structures probably reflect some of the most basic set of
values and principles that Americans by and large ascribe to the Con-
stitution. Drawing on both of these existing constitutional doctrines as
interpreted by courts for guidance provides the flexibility needed to
ensure that our judicial treatment addresses important elements of
competing constitutional concerns, while at the same time providing
judges with clear and doctrinally based parameters. 4
Third, individuals are likely to debate the core elements of
speech and property that explain how courts protect each, and may
harbor reasons that are different from those described in this Article.
Such debate is inevitable, and is likely to result in principled clarity
and direction rather than the frustration that presently arises from
mechanically applying high First Amendment scrutiny to political
money.
C. Reconciling the Intersection in the Campaign Finance Context
The preceding discussion identified the problem of an intersec-
tion of liberty interests generally, and provided some broad principles
233. Cf. Fiss, supra note 98, at 2477:
In ordinary parlance, money is not speech, and so it may be difficult to understand how
Congress's effort to regulate political expenditures may have been deemed to violate this
provision. But, as in all matters legal, the proper guide for interpretation is not ordinary
usage, that is, whether in everyday conversation we treat money as speech. The Court
should instead take a more functional approach, in which it identifies the fundamental
purposes of freedom of speech and then construes the text to effectuate those purposes.
234. A defender of the status quo might argue that if courts respond to the intersection in the
most glaring cases, like campaign finance, judges will subsequently find an intersection in every
matter (e.g., flag burning), and select the liberty interest that gives the most discretion to the
state. The Court's articulation of clear principles limited to particular activities that truly
exhibit intersecting constitutional liberties, as well as the doctrine of stare decisis, would limit
such a slippery-slope progression. See infra Part V.C.
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to consider in navigating the intersection. This Article now turns from
the abstract discussion of different constitutional liberties to the con-
crete question of how courts should respond to both expressive and
proprietary liberties in reviewing campaign finance regulation.
Perhaps the best vehicle for considering both proprietary and
expressive liberties in the campaign finance context would be a judi-
cial standard that simultaneously gives the public lawmaking process
broad discretion in regulating political money generally, but closely
scrutinizes the regulation for political entrenchment.s Such a stan-
dard would give the legislature the opportunity to take into considera-
tion the issues of scarcity, distribution, and interference with others'
interests common to both property and political money, while ad-
dressing judicial concerns about entrenchment of incumbent political
power shared by both speech and political money.3
One concern that might be raised with judicial oversight of po-
litical money regulation for entrenchment involves the claim that
principled judicial review in the political context is impossible-that
235. While anti-entrenchment is most commonly understood as an Equal Protection issue, it
has also been recognized as a First Amendment principle. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
30-32 (1968); ELY, supra note 151, at 106-07; Amar, supra note 163, at 1147. It is also important
to acknowledge that, unfortunately, the Court has failed to vigorously defend an anti-
entrenchment principle in recent years. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reappor-
tionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 736-40 (1998) (analyzing the "Court's
weakening commitment to an anti-entrenchment principle"); Jamin B. Raskin, The Supreme
Court's Racial Double Standard in Redistricting: Unequal Protection in Politics and the Scholar-
ship That Defends It, 14 J. L. & POL. 591, 615 (1998) (criticizing the fact that "the Court is
completely nonchalant about accepting incumbent and partisan self-entrenchment as legitimate
state interests"); see, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997)
(finding that it is reasonable for a state to enact regulations "that may, in practice, favor the
traditional two-party system ... and that temper the destabilizing effects of party-splintering
and excessive factionalism"). Although the Supreme Court has recently tolerated entrenchment
rather than explicitly rejecting it as a constitutionally impermissible value, entrenchment
continues to be recognized as a problem that warrants redress in other contexts, such as corpo-
rate law. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-54 (Del. 1985) ("Delaware
corporation may deal selectively with its stockholders, provided the directors have not acted out
of a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office.'); Steven G. Bradbury, Note,
Corporate Auctions and Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third-Generation Business Judgment
Rule, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 276, 284 (1988) (analyzing Unocal and explaining that "[d]irectors lack
good faith when they act for the purpose of entrenching themselves in office and without the
honest belief that their actions are in the company's best interest).
236. Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 913 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring,
joined by Ginsburg, J.) ("We should defer to [the legislature's] political judgment that unlimited
spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process. But we should not defer in respect to
whether its solution, by imposing too low a contribution limit, significantly increases the reputa-




courts should not enter the "political thicket." "n The thought is that in
the absence of simple, objectively determinate standards for resolving
questions that are heavily charged with partisan political interests,
judicial intervention leads only to confusion and ad hoc adjudication.
It is particularly difficult to apply an anti-entrenchment test in the
campaign finance context, the argument goes, because there exists no
settled or neutral measure of the optimal campaign finance system,"a
and thus no "baseline standard against which to measure imper-
missible entrenchment. '' " In other words, it is often unclear whether
particular campaign finance reform entrenches incumbents. For ex-
ample, while some would say that a $100,000 spending limitation for
all congressional candidates levels the playing field, others would say
that the $100,000 spending limitation entrenches incumbents because
it prevents challengers with low name recognition from spending
enough money to introduce themselves and their ideas to the public."
Critics might claim that the difficulty in ascertaining a clear definition
of entrenchment would result in activist judges employing their own
private, political philosophies in reviewing all political money regula-
tion." While the status quo's reliance upon the economic and speech
markets may be imperfect, the argument goes, it at least provides a
workable baseline for determining judicial protection of political
money."
Courts have, however, struggled with challenges of judicial
manageability in the development of other areas of the law, such as
237. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., writing for a three-Justice
plurality) (holding redistricting claims to be nonjusticiable, reasoning that "[c]ourts ought not to
enter this political thicket.'). Colegrove was effectively overruled by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
238. Cf. Shrink, 120 S. Ct. at 925 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.) ("[C]ourts have
no yardstick by which to judge the proper amount and effectiveness of campaign speech.').
239. Klarman, supra note 152, at 537.
240. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 37, at 1072-73 ("Contribution limits tend to favor incum-
bents by making it harder for challengers to raise money ... The consequent need to raise
campaign cash from a large number of small contributors benefits those candidates who have in
place a database of past contributors, an intact campaign organization, and the ability to raise
funds on an ongoing basis from PACs.') (footnote omitted).
241. See Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, The United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1445, 1462 (1985) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 301 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing)). An objective of formal categorization of the law by scholars in the late nineteenth century
was to "create a sharp distinction between law and politics and to portray law as neutral,
natural, and apolitical." HORWITZ, supra note 97, at 170.
242. See Strauss, supra note 139, at 1386 ('The market ordering may be far from optimal in
a theoretical sense.... The only thing to be said for that system is that the alternative-a
legislative rearrangement of political participation rights according to an unenforceable criterion
of equality-is likely to be worse.').
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regulatory takings243 and reapportionment of voting districts, "44 because
they understand the importance of the issues at stake. Recognizing
the important issues raised by money in politics, as well as the impor-
tance of checking legislative abuses, the manageability issue is worth
addressing with regard to an anti-entrenchment test, rather than be-
ing a reason to give up on this alternative form of judicial review of
campaign finance regulations.
Admittedly, there exists no single, fixed, universal definition of
entrenchment, as one could argue that almost all regulation of politi-
cal money has the effect of advantaging certain groups. 5 The lack of a
seemingly "natural" baseline, however, does not end the inquiry.
Rather than aspiring toward a "goal" such as equality (as is done in
the one person, one vote reapportionment context),"5 an anti-en-
trenchment test can aspire to prevent an identifiable evil. For exam-
ple, Voting Rights Act § 5 requires that officials in certain jurisdictions
submit proposed changes to voting laws to the Justice Department or
a special three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia for preclearance in an attempt to prevent the identifiable
evil of state officials manipulating electoral rules to dilute the voting
strength of racial minorities. 7 By analogy, the objective of an anti-
entrenchment test would be to prevent lawmakers from using their
official powers to manipulate political advantages in the course of
restricting political money, thereby entrenching incumbent officials or
particular parties, messages, or ideological viewpoints."8
243. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
244. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
234-37 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
245. Indeed, the fact that entrenchment is not a universal principle supports the use of an
anti-entrenchment standard. Some assert that the objective of government regulation of political
money is to silence individuals, presumably so as to entrench political power. See, e.g., Kathleen
Sullivan, supra note 221, at 316 ("Campaign finance limits are surely aimed at the communica-
tive impact of speech.'). This statement is too broad to adequately address this context-specific
issue, and the dangers of loosely regulated political money (unlike those of loosely regulated
speech) are too problematic to blindly accept the statement. While it is important to be aware of
the threat of entrenchment associated with all political money regulation, entrenchment should
not be universalized and taken away from courts. Rather, the issue of whether a law is en-
trenching should be treated as an empirical question for judicial determination on a statute-by-
statute basis.
246. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558.
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
248. As anti-entrenchment involves the prevention of a legislatively enacted evil rather than
aspiration toward a defined goal, the anti-entrenchment principle would be limited to striking
down entrenching legislation, and would not mandate the creation of a particular type of non-
entrenching campaign finance reform legislation.
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There are two possible sets of legal guidelines that could be ju-
dicially created to review campaign finance laws for entrenchment.
These different sets of guidelines operate differently in the context of
the dual goals of preventing entrenchment and protecting courts from
seeming to take sides in partisan politics. On one hand, courts could
adopt a few bright line anti-entrenchment rules, but in exchange for
clarity and certainty, the rules would sacrifice precision, especially
recognizing the complexity of various campaign finance reforms. 9 On
the other hand, courts could adopt a more flexible anti-entrenchment
standard that considered all the underlying facts and circumstances.
The problem, however, is that a standard is likely to provoke claims
that courts are unbounded and inconsistently overreach into the po-
litical thicket.'
While these claims can never be completely silenced, perhaps
the best form of an anti-entrenchment test enhances clarity and con-
sistency through defined factors and compromises as little as possible
with regard to accuracy. Under one possible test, the campaign fi-
nance statute is subjected to high scrutiny only if it is deemed en-
trenching, 1 and subjected to rational basis scrutiny if it is not deemed
249. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1689-90 (1976); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577, 577-78 (1988); see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 66 (1992) (criticizing rules as "suppress[ing] relevant similarities and differ-
ences'). There are other problems with the crystalline rule. The clear entrenchment rule tells
the entrenching legislator the precise limits within which she can get away with her entrench-
ment schemes, and invites legislators to ride the line. A more flexible entrenchment standard
may "chill" legislative attempts at entrenchment through campaign finance regulation (because
they are uncertain that they will be able to get away with it), and may even compel legislators to
go out of their way to create campaign finance reform that is clearly non-entrenching for political
fear that a court will label them "entrenchers." The clear entrenchment rule also provokes claims
that courts are engaging in a legislative function (e.g., a judicial rule deeming contribution limits
under $50 as entrenching establishes the lowest possible contribution limit in a legislative
fashion).
250. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80
(1989) (arguing that judicial rules promote judicial restraint). Instead of a clear allocation of the
boundaries between the judiciary and the legislature, the standard raises concerns about judges
manipulating the standard to support their own political outlooks, the development of an
unstable doctrine comprised of inconsistent holdings, and well-endowed political causes impacted
by particular campaign finance reform making courts their new political battleground. A
standard could also breed a false sense of security among the electorate, who might feel as
though they need not scrutinize campaign finance through democracy because the task is done
by courts. Further, an anti-entrenchment standard might discourage honest legislators from
passing campaign finance reform due to the uncertain possibility that a court will invalidate the
legislation and implicitly label the legislator "entrenchment-minded."
251. One might argue that corruption and entrenchment are inconsistent (e.g., a $150 con-
tribution limitation that prevents corruption may be entrenching), or at least inquire into the
relationship between corruption and entrenchment. In the event a campaign finance regulation
is deemed entrenching under the anti-entrenchment test articulated below, the regulation will be
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entrenching. The test has three steps. Each step represents a distinct
way in which a court may find entrenchment.
First, a court automatically deems a statute entrenching if the
law, on its face, classifies by individual qualifications other than chal-
lenger status," or classifies by party affiliations, message content, or
ideological viewpoint."s For example, a law. that explicitly restricted
the spending of only Reform Party candidates to $300,000 would be
deemed entrenching.
Under the second step, judges would determine entrenchment
by considering whether the statute burdens challengers as a class
more than incumbents as a class. A court would make this deter-
mination based upon the following two factors: (a) whether the new
plan is likely to increase incumbent advantages in any disparity be-
tween incumbents and challengers in raising or spending political
money; and (b) whether the new plan is likely to create greater bar-
riers to entry into politics, minimize competition, and decrease the
frequency of entry and success by challengers.' For example, a
$300,000 spending limit on all candidates for governor in California,
where media costs are very high, could prevent challengers from de-
subject to high scrutiny. A restriction on expenditures will be upheld if it is necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest, and a restriction on contributions will be upheld if it is closely drawn
to match a sufficiently important state interest.
252. This exception to the facial neutrality of the test recognizes the unique problems faced
by many challengers, and permits lawmakers to enact regulations that would give challengers
advantages to compensate for these problems. For example, the spending limit for the cam-
paigns of incumbents might be 80% of what it is for challengers. Note that the second part of the
test would prevent lawmakers from enacting restrictions that advantaged incumbents (e.g.,
limiting spending by challengers to 80% of the limit on incumbents).
253. Whereas courts permit legislatures to discriminate against different classes of people in
making decisions about economic affairs, they are particularly distrustful of legislative discrimi-
nation against different classes of people in the speech context. While any campaign finance
plan discriminates against some individuals (high or no limits may discriminate against the
poor, low limits may discriminate against the rich), an objective in judicial review is to work to
minimize the manipulation of campaign finance regulations to discriminate against particular
speech, speakers, or perspectives. Insisting upon some degree of facial neutrality may be the
most expedient way to accomplish this goal.
254. The manageability of the anti-entrenchment test is furthered by the fact that it invali-
dates political money legislation that has an entrenching impact as opposed to invalidating
legislation only when a legislative purpose of entrenchment is conclusively established. A
particular piece of campaign finance legislation is likely to result from both illegitimate en-
trenchment motives and defensible non-entrenchment considerations, and a court might have
difficulty in determining which "caused" the enactment of the legislation. See Klarman, supra
note 152, at 529. Further, legislators could hide their entrenchment strategies behind the guise
of a relatively "benign" motive, such as the need for incumbents (but not challengers) to receive




veloping public recognition, and thus might decrease the frequency of
success by challengers.
The third step would allow courts to declare entrenching cer-
tain statutes that technically pass the first two steps, but are un-
doubtedly inconsistent with the purpose of the test, which is to mini-
mize lawmakers from using their official powers to manipulate politi-
cal advantages in the course of restricting political money.' For
example, a law that restricted spending to $300,000 for all candidates,
but allowed unlimited spending for any candidate whose party had
garnered at least 30% of the vote in the previous election, would not
disadvantage the Reform Party on its face and it might not disad-
vantage challengers as a class. The plan would, however, undoubtedly
entrench Democrats and Republicans.
This factored test effectively deals with incumbent official en-
trenchment and the most obvious attempts to disadvantage certain
individuals or the content of speech. It implements the primary prin-
ciples underlying both regulation of property and protection of speech.
Admittedly, the test will miss non-facial entrenchment by majorities
and others who hope to exclude certain groups or the content of speech
in covert ways that involve doubt as to entrenchment. This line, how-
ever, may be necessary to draw. In all but the most glaring cases, it is
difficult for a court to determine with any appearance of objectivity
which groups are "outs" that should be given advantages, and which
groups are "ins" that are attempting to entrench themselves. Further,
some campaign finance reforms that increase opportunities for chal-
lengers in most districts and that a court determines are not en-
trenching on the whole may, in a few individual races in particular
districts, have the effect of advantaging particular incumbent offi-
cials.' These exceptions should not be troubling recognizing that
almost any type of reform generally enhancing competition will benefit
a few incumbents, ' and that reform that disadvantages a majority of
255. Like "beyond a reasonable doubt" or "reasonable suspicion," "undoubtedly" is a neces-
sarily flexible term. While courts should not pick winners and losers when it is a close call as to
whether a law is entrenching, courts should not be so mechanical that they fail to invalidate laws
that are clearly entrenching, but designed to be just outside the scope of the language of a
judicial test. Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-48 (1960) (finding that legislative
redefinition of city borders of Tuskegee, Alabama so that all but a few of its 400 black voters
were denied the right to vote in municipal elections violated the Fifteenth Amendment, despite
the fact that legislation did not explicitly mention race).
256. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 168, at 1403 ('Whether campaign finance limits in general do
entrench incumbents is an empirical question .... Probably the fairest generalization is that
campaign finance limits in general do not entrench incumbents, but that there are important
individual cases in which such limits prevent challengers from mounting serious efforts.").
257. Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 909 (2000) ("[A] showing of one af-
fected individual does not point up a system of suppressed political advocacy that would be
20001 1301
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
incumbent officials in relation to challengers is unlikely to be moti-
vated by unfair self-interest.
As with most judicial tests, courts will need to hone a number
of details of anti-entrenchment doctrine over time. For example, it is
questionable whether the anti-entrenchment doctrine should allow for
a direct legal challenge to substantive legislation based on the argu-
ment that the lawmakers enacted the law attempting to obtain more
money from special interest contributors." While the anti-entrench-
ment standard is a crucial tool for thoroughly scrutinizing campaign
finance regulation, it might become unwieldy and burdensome if
available as a weapon to challenge the validity of every substantive
law." Similarly, doctrinal development will need to resolve whether
claims can be brought against restrictions that were not entrenching
when passed but have become so due to changed circumstances, as
well as how to evaluate restrictions on political money used in support
of referenda and initiatives.
With regard to judicial manageability, the anti-entrenchment
test falls somewhere along the gamut between bright lines and vague
standards that courts presently use in navigating the political thicket.
On one extreme, the mechanical one person, one vote rule in the re-
apportionment context exists." The more flexible Section Two Voting
Rights Act claim requires that a court take several concrete factors
into consideration and make a decision based on a "totality of the
circumstances" standard. 6' On the more nebulous end of the spectrum,
the Supreme Court has adopted a vague standard that finds a parti-
san gerrymandering violation when "the electoral system substan-
tially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence
the political process effectively."
26
unconstitutional"); id. at 913 (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.) ("[A]ny contribution
statute... will narrow the field of conceivable challengers to some degree. Undue insulation is a
practical matter, and it cannot be inferred automatically from the fact that the limit makes
ballot access more difficult for one previously unsuccessful candidate.").
258. In other words, it is questionable whether Beta, Inc. should be allowed to bring an ac-
tion to invalidate legislation giving its competitor, Alpha, Inc., a special encryption export
exemption based on the claim that legislators passed the law hoping to attract financial contri-
butions from Alpha, Inc.
259. Cf. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re-
view?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 48-66 (1991) (criticizing improper influence challenges to substantive
laws based on the difficulty in determining what constitutes the baseline for appropriate influ-
ence and effective limitations on intrusive judicial review).
260. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quoting Gay v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
381 (1963)).
261. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986).
262. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986).
1302 [Vol. 53:1235
MISTAKEN IDENTITY
In considering the factored anti-entrenchment test, it is also
important to note that, in Buckley, the Court entered the political
thicket in reviewing campaign finance regulations. While the Court
was able to use First Amendment doctrine as guidance, the First
Amendment says nothing about prevention of corruption being a com-
pelling governmental interest, or the distinction between contribu-
tions and expenditures. At a certain point, the Court had to develop
some standards and rules in this highly political context, and in doing
so, the Court's decision had profound implications with regard to
"winners and losers" in the distribution of political power in society.
Indeed, by giving the legislature more authority with regard to politi-
cal money than the current standard under Buckley, the factored anti-
entrenchment test would, to some degree, represent a retreat from the
political thicket.
Not only did the Court in Buckley enter the political thicket,
but it also applied relatively vague standards in determining whether
regulations are too incumbent friendly. For example, in a section of
the opinion that is not heavily cited, the Court found that the contri-
bution limits of $1000 did not disadvantage challengers.' In ana-
lyzing whether the $1000 contribution limits tended to benefit incum-
bents as a class, the court examined a wide range of nebulous factors,
such as how often challengers defeat incumbents, the extent of incum-
bents being able to attract very large contributions, and the effect of
contribution limits on minor party and independent candidates.'" In
the campaign finance context, courts apply similarly vague standards
in determining whether contribution limits are too low,"6 and whether
conditions for participating in public financing are so coercive that
they infringe upon the First Amendment rights of candidates.
6
Courts are in the business of articulating standards and inter-
preting them, even in the absence of bright lines and fixed categories.
The proposed entrenchment test to determine when the legislature
263. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 32-35 (1976).
264. See id.
265. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 909 (2000) (analyzing whether the
contribution limits at issue differed "in degree" or "in kind" from those upheld in Buckley, and
adopting a nebulous inquiry that asks "whether the contribution limitation was so radical in
effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below
the level of notice, and render contributions pointless"); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (acknowledging
the absence of bright lines by explaining that "a court has no scalpel to probe" the precise dollar
amount at which a contribution limit becomes too low).
266. See Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that "voluntari-
ness has proven to be an important factor in judicial ratification" of public financing systems and
that "there is a point at which regulatory incentives stray beyond the pale, creating disparities so
profound that they become impermissibly coercive').
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overextends its authority in regulating political money is no more
nebulous, or difficult to ascertain, than assessing the precise point at
which a regulation becomes so disproportionately burdensome on a
property owner that a taking of her property exists. u7 Despite the is-
sues associated with determining entrenchment, there is no excuse for
exacerbation of the entrenchment problem through continued immu-
nization of political money from meaningful legislative restrictions.'
In using the anti-entrenchment standard to reexamine the va-
lidity of the 1974 Act originally examined in Buckley, a court would
not automatically apply high scrutiny simply because the 1974 Act
involves restrictions on political money (as the court did in Buckley
and its progeny), but would apply high scrutiny only upon a finding
that the provisions of the 1974 Act were entrenching. It does not ap-
pear that the 1974 Act, on its face, classifies by individual qualifica-
tions, party affiliations, message content, or ideological viewpoint, and
therefore the 1974 Act cannot be said to be entrenching under the first
step of the anti-entrenchment test.
21
Under the second step, a court would determine entrenchment
by considering whether the statute burdens challengers as a class
more than incumbents as a class. A court would make decisions based
upon the credibility of testimony of the parties' experts (e.g., political
scientists, economists), as well as any additional experts the court may
want to appoint. In evaluating the 1974 Act, the experts would look to
see whether its provisions, as a whole, are likely to increase incum-
267. In determining whether a taking exists, a court may use a three-factor balancing test
that considers: (a) the character of the government action; (b) the magnitude of the diminution of
value; and (c) the effect on "distinct investment-backed expectations." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
268. Courts in other countries have successfully administered an anti-entrenchment review
of political money regulation. For example, the highest court in Germany invoked anti-
entrenchment principles in invalidating tax deductions for campaign contributions that unfairly
"favor[ed] those parties whose programs and activities appeal to wealthy circles." DONALD P.
KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 203
(2d ed. 1997) (translated from Party Finance Case 11, 8 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 51 (1958)); see also Issacharoff & Pildes,
supra note 152, at 695-97 (discussing anti-entrenchment review of campaign finance regulations
in various cases by German courts).
269. One might argue that by placing certain prerequisites upon the receipt of public fi-
nancing for candidates in presidential elections, the 1974 Act classifies by individual qualifica-
tions, and is thus entrenching. See 26 U.S.C. § 9002(6)-(8) (1994) (defining major, minor, and
new parties); id. § 9004(a) (distinguishing the amount given to candidates in major, minor, and
new parties). While reasonable minds may differ, it is plausible that credible judicial interpreta-
tion would recognize that Congress should be allowed to institute minimal qualifying require-
ments for the receipt of public funds, and would find these classifications entrenching only upon
a determination that they undoubtedly entrenched particular political groups (e.g., Democrats
and Republicans, see infra text accompanying notes 270-74).
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bent advantages in raising or spending political money, and create
greater barriers to entry into politics, minimize competition, and de-
crease the frequency of entry and success by challengers. In other
words, the expert would not look to a particular provision in isolation
to determine entrenchment, but would look to the 1974 Act as a whole
in the context of electoral realities such as the cost of media, printing,
and staff support, and the impact of news media coverage. While some
might claim that the 1974 Act is entrenching,7 ' a cursory review sug-
gests that the 1974 Act would not be entrenching under the second
test.27" ' Most incumbents spend more than most challengers, and have
a greater ability to attract large contributions and independent ex-
penditures. Further, the spending and contribution limits are high
enough so that challengers would be able to raise and spend enough
money to develop name recognition. Additionally, the public financing
provisions do not seem to benefit a particular incumbent president
more than individual insurgent presidential candidates.
With regard to the third step, one might argue that the presi-
dential public financing provisions make the 1974 Act entrenching
because they are undoubtedly inconsistent with the purposes of the
test. Incumbent lawmakers from the Democratic and Republican par-
ties have used their official powers to advantage their own parties and
disadvantage other political parties, one would argue, by giving a set
amount to "major" party candidates and a lesser amount to "minor"?
party candidates.272 Entrenchment, however, is not as undoubted when
one considers the following points: (1) it may be impracticable for Con-
gress to give public financing to every single person who has the incli-
nation to run for president regardless of popular support (i.e., quali-
270. In Buckley, appellants unsuccessfully argued that the restrictions on political money
invidiously discriminated against challengers. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30-35. The Court addressed
"only the argument that the contribution limits alone impermissibly discriminate[d] against non-
incumbents" but speculated that "[w]here the incumbent has the support of major special-
interest groups... and is further supported by the media, the overall effect of the contribution
and expenditure limitations enacted by Congress could foreclose any fair opportunity of a
successful challenge." Id. at 31 n.33. It ruled that in the absence of expenditure limits, however,
the contribution limits alone did not unconstitutionally discriminate against challengers. See id.
at 35, 39.
271. Cf. Fiss, supra note 98, at 2475 (discusses possible self-dealing in creating FECA and
does not find any).
272. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 152, at 688-90 (explaining how current public fi-
nancing laws provide certain funding exclusively for the two major parties, and suggesting that
courts police campaign finance regulation to ensure it does not "further entrench bipartisan
political lockups'). Note that Buckley did not analyze public financing under the same "rigorous"
or "strict" scrutiny used to analyze restrictions on political contributions and spending. Buckley,
424 U.S. at 90-91. For entrenchment purposes, however, government allocations are as prob-
lematic as government restrictions, and therefore it is logical to include public financing in the
analysis of the entrenchment impact of campaign finance legislation.
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fying lines must be drawn at some point); (2) by receiving at least 25%
of the votes in an election, a minor party can become a major party in
a subsequent election;73 and (3) the minor party receives a portion of
the major party entitlement determined by the ratio of the votes re-
ceived by the minor party's candidate in the last election in relation to
the average of the votes received by the major parties' candidates."4 In
short, while the anti-entrenchment test would come to some different
results than Buckley, it would maintain respect for constitutional
speech values, but also acknowledge the relevance of constitutional
property doctrines.
CONCLUSION
Rather than proficiently navigating the intersection of the First
Amendment and the Property Clauses, the Buckley Court ignored the
juncture and applied high First Amendment scrutiny in reviewing
limitations on political money. As a result, the Court overlooked and
failed to accommodate constitutionally relevant issues. When constitu-
tional doctrines intersect in the political money context, there is no
good reason courts must mechanically apply the higher standard of
scrutiny. The issues that motivate courts to respect legislative regula-
tion of property do not necessarily disappear in the political sphere,
and need not be disregarded due to the reasons courts protect speech.
The functional similarities between property and political money, and
the functional differences between speech and political money, should
raise questions about automatically applying the traditional First
Amendment formula to the regulation of political money. While the
concurrence by Justice Stevens in Shrink highlighted important issues
previously unaddressed by the Court, this critique also applies to the
use of constitutional property doctrine in the political money context
to the exclusion of First Amendment doctrine.
Indeed, the formalist aspiration for neatness, transparency,
and clear discipline cannot rationally be carried to the extreme of in-
sisting, for purposes of legal doctrines, that everything in the world be
"fitted" into a prefabricated legal category. Rather than being confined
to a mutually exclusive selection of either property or speech analysis,
courts should be able to draw upon both. A better method of ascer-
taining the most appropriate judicial treatment of political money
273. See 26 U.S.C. § 9002(6) (1994).
274. See id. § 9004(a)(2)(A).
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would consider the functional purposes explaining judicial protection
of speech from regulation, as well as the functional purposes of judicial
respect for property regulation.
An anti-entrenchment standard of review for campaign finance
regulation is one example of the implementation of such a methodol-
ogy. This tool should be employed by judges looking for the best pos-
sible way for the judiciary to play its proper role, in relation to the
legislature, of securing and effectuating the objectives of both the First
Amendment and the Property Clauses. An anti-entrenchment stan-
dard would, as in the property context, allow the legislature to con-
sider issues of scarcity and distribution in determining substantive
values with regard to political money, and identify boundaries of indi-
vidual interests and uses that unfairly interfere with others' interests.
In making these assessments, the legislature would not be limited to
examining individual rights in isolation (e.g., whether an individual's
$1000 contribution is likely to result in quid pro quo), but could, as
with environmental regulations of property, consider the impact of
activities cumulatively (e.g., whether undesirable implications arise
from a political system financed predominantly by less than one per-
cent of the population). At the same time, the judiciary would review
the procedural fairness of the democratic process by scrutinizing pos-
sible entrenchment effects of the regulation consistent with objectives
advanced by judicial protection of speech."5 In preventing incumbent
political forces from using the power of government to establish cam-
paign finance rules that disenfranchise dissenters, 6 an anti-
entrenchment standard would complement a constitution that is not
limited to the protection of absolute or uniform individual rights, but
also contemplates the structural stability of democracy as a whole.
Those favoring the reform of campaign finance laws might note
that the application of an anti-entrenchment standard of review does
not compel the creation of campaign finance regulation that enhances
democratic participation, and that the public lawmaking process may
determine that additional regulation of political money is not needed.
While the anti-entrenchment standard does not compel campaign
finance reform, there is good reason to believe the legislature would
enact such laws if the standard were adopted by courts.
275. See ELY, supra note 151, at 103; Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 152, at 670.
276. Cf. Larue, supra note 178, at 1011-14 (focusing on the importance of the First Amend-
ment in allowing citizens to censure officeholders).
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Legislative institutions often glean lessons from judicial pro-
nouncements."7 For example, the holding of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion2 7 8 provided a new cultural understanding that resulted in later
civil rights legislation.79 Currently, courts apply conventional speech
tests to determine the appropriate protection for political money, and
this application teaches our collective conscience that any campaign
finance reform, even reform technically consistent with Buckley as it
was originally decided, runs counter to the spirit of the First Amend-
ment. If this lesson were changed, and courts acknowledged and re-
sponded to the property characteristics of political money in their
constitutional pronouncements (or at least acknowledged the tension),
public lawmaking may take away a different lesson.
Further, although lawmakers (even in light of the current ob-
structionary presence of Buckley) could more effectively regulate cam-
paign finance through devices such as public financing for con-
gressional and senatorial candidates, perhaps they do not do so as a
result of their dependency on those with political money. If given more
discretion than presently afforded, legislators might be able to enact
reasonable but meaningful restrictions on political money without fear
of discipline from the small percentage of the population that pres-
ently controls the distribution of political money."w While the anti-
entrenchment standard does not compel campaign finance reform or
guarantee the resolution of all problems related to political money, it
does give the legislature the discretion to respond to identified needs
and problems as they arise, consistent with conventional under-
standings of the appropriate function of the public lawmaking
277. Cf. Michelman, supra note 134, at 135 (suggesting that Madison may have understood
judicial enforcement of the Takings Clause as teaching a lesson of respect for negative property
which would "carry over into a spirit of popular and legislative moderation when it came to the
exercise of regulatory and taxing powers .... ").
278. Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
279. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 12 (1994); Mark Tushnet, The Significance
of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173, 178-79 (1994). But see Michael J. Kilarman,
Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 13 (1994); Michael J.
Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It And How Much Did It Matter?, 83 GEO. L.J. 433, 452-
53 (1994); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 49-57 (1991).
280. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 12, at 1177 ("Less than one percent of the nation's
population contributed seventy-seven percent of all campaign funds raised in the 1992 election
cycle.'); Jonathan Alter & Michael Isikoff, The Real Scandal Is What's Legal, NEWSWEEK, Oct.
28, 1996, at 30 ("99.97 percent of Americans don't make political contributions of more than
$200.'); Michael Kranish, Whites Give Most in Political Funding, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1998,
at A3 ("80 percent of federal campaign contributions come from about 0.50 percent of the popula-
tion.!).
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process."' Comparisons between legislative opposition to campaign
finance reform and legislative opposition to term limitations are im-
perfect,2 for unlike term limitations, meaningful campaign finance
reform is not necessarily terminal to an incumbent legislator's
career.' In short, it is possible that in light of the flexibility granted
by an anti-entrenchment standard of review, a legislature might pass
lower contribution limits, limits on independent and candidate expen-
ditures, and public financing for campaigns for all elected positions.'
Despite the enhanced possibility of campaign finance reform
associated with judicial application of an anti-entrenchment standard,
the legislature might make the policy determination that political
money regulation is not needed at this time. While one might, as a
private citizen, disagree with the legislature on substantive grounds,
the role of the legislature in making that policy determination is le-
gitimate. Adoption of judicial tests that give greater respect to demo-
cratic decisions should not serve as a pretext to promote a particular
type of campaign finance reform. Rather, the debate by constitu-
tionalists over issues of political money, as well as the quality of de-
mocracy itself, would benefit by shifting more of the decision-making
authority to the legislative sphere, thus opening discussion of the
issue to all citizens.
281. One might argue that even if the legislature obtained the political will to enact non-
entrenching campaign finance reform that initially improved the political process, politicians will
inevitably search for, and eventually find, loopholes so that they can gain advantages over a
competitor. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 660 (observing that the unintended
consequence of public financing of presidential campaigns and party conventions is that public
money is used in addition to, as opposed to instead of, private political money raised through
party soft money and convention host-city funds). While one could interpret ever-evolving
attempts to circumvent political money regulation as a sign that political money is unregulable,
a better conclusion may be that the public lawmaking process should be given more flexibility to
regulate political money. More flexibility would give the public lawmaking process additional
tools to prevent circumvention in the first place, and greater flexibility to close a loophole once it
is detected.
282. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot Notations, 85
VA. L. REV. 1533, 1539 (1999) (claiming that "[d]irect democracy is often the only outlet for such
groups that advocate reforms presenting conflicts of interest for representatives-reforms like
term limits [and] campaign finance reform).
283. Cf. Klarman, supra note 152, at 504 (recognizing an entrenchment continuum, at which
one pole term limits exist that "may guarantee that [legislators] will not be reelected" where as
other issues along the continuum, such as reapportionment, "may simply reduce their chances of
being reelected").
284. Additionally, the fact that legislatures and citizens supporting ballot initiatives have
attempted to enact meaningful reform since Buckley (much of which has been invalidated by
courts applying Buckley's principles) suggests that legislatures and citizens would enact reform if
liberated from Buckley's constraints. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 295 (1981); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 (1978); Carver
v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 645 (8th Cir. 1995); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359 (8th Cir. 1994);
Vannatta v. Keisling, 899 F. Supp. 488, 497 (D. Or. 1995).
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Individuals will surely dispute the specifics of the anti-
entrenchment standard, and some may favor a different strategy.
Whatever one thinks of the particulars, the central issue is that politi-
cal money resides within an intersection of competing constitutional
doctrines, and courts need to cultivate a more discerning methodology
for negotiating that intersection. Abandoning Buckley's extreme for-
malism and acknowledging that political money is both a property and
speech question not only expands judicial perception to permit a more
complete understanding of the nature of political money. Our republic
is best served through democratic deliberation and decision-making
regarding campaign financing that is reviewed using judicial tools
tailored to the intricacies of political money. Such devices would allow
for courts to take into account the respect for public lawmaking found
in property jurisprudence, and simultaneously scrutinize political
money regulations in ways that advance the specific objectives that
explain protection of speech.
Although Justice Stevens does not address or resolve all issues
associated with the campaign finance dilemma, his reminder that
"[m]oney is property" makes a profound contribution by challenging
flawed assumptions. Language shapes the world, we are told. If so,
Justice Stevens helps construct a more accurate definition of political
money that allows us to envision a more equitable society. 'Property"
describes political money just as precisely as "speech" describes politi-
cal money, and there is no reason that courts should not take into con-
sideration both speech doctrine and property doctrine in developing a
new way to look at campaign finance.
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